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1992 / The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
bNRODUCTION

For many years European civil law jurisdictions, most notably
France, have protected the "moral rights," or "droit moral," of
visual artists.' The concept of moral rights protects the rights of a
creator of a work of visual art to claim or disclaim authorship of
his or her work (the "right of paternity" or "droit d la paternitd,"
and the "right of disavowal"); 2 to decide when to "publish," or
reveal the work to the public (the "right of disclosure" or "droit
de divulgation");3 to withdraw the work from publication or make
modifications to the work (the "right of withdrawal or
modification" or "droit de retrait ou de repentir");4 and to
prevent the defacement or alteration of the work (the "right of
integrity" or "droit au respect de l'oeuvre").5 More than sixty
nations currently protect artists' moral rights.'
American courts, while often sympathetic to artists whose moral
rights have been violated, have been reluctant to create moral rights
as a matter of common law.7 Traditionally, the law in the United
States has focused upon protection of the artist's economic, rather
than personal rights The concept of moral rights was almost
universally characterized by American courts as inconsistent with

1. See generally Lewis, The 'DroitMoral' in FrenchLaw-Part1,5 EuR. INTELL PROP. L.
REv. 341 (1983); Lewis, The Droit Moral' in French Law-Part 1, 6 EUR. INTEL.. PROP. L. REV.
11 (1984); DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in
France and the United States, 28 COPYRIGHT SOC'Y OF THE U.S.A. BULL 1 (1981); Sarraute,
CurrentTheory on the MoralRights ofAuthors andArtimtr Under FrenchLaw, 16 AM. J. CoMP. L
465 (1968) (general explanations and history of the French droit moral statutes and cases).
2.
See DaSilva, supra note 1, at 26-30 (discussing the right of paternity).
3. See id. at 17-23 (discussing the right of disclosure).
4.
See id at 23-30 (discussing the right of withdrawal or modification).
5. See id at 30-37 (discussing the right of integrity).
6.
Comment, Copyright:Moral Right-A Proposal 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 793, 797 (1975).
7.
See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am.Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976); Vargas v.
Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947), cert denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948); Crimi v. Rutgers
Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 575, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (1949) (cases holding that the
doctrine of moral rights is not recognized in the United States).
8.
Comment, An Artist's Personal Rights in His Creative Works: Beyond the Human
Cannonballand the Flying Circus,9 PAC. LJ.855, 862 (1978). See Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585,
590 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., concurring) (American copyright law protects economic interests, but
not personal interests).
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American societal norms.' As a result of the failure of the courts
to recognize any degree of protection for moral rights in the United
States, several states have enacted statutes offering artists some
protection for their moral rights.1"
On December 1, 1990, Congress passed the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990. The Act became effective June 1, 1991.12
The 1990 Act encompasses many rights found in the French droit
moral, as well as rights specified by various state statutes. The
Visual Artists Rights Act explicitly preempts similar state law
provisions.13
Part I of this Article discusses the protections offered to artists'
moral rights by state moral rights statutes, 4 with particular
emphasis on the California 15 and New York 6 statutes. Part II
sets forth and discusses the specific provisions of the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990, and attempts to ascertain the congressional
intent behind several of the more nebulous provisions of the
Act. 7 Part II of this Article discusses the probable preemptive
effect of the Visual Artists Rights Act on analogous state law
provisions."1
I. STATE MORAL RIGHTS STATUTES
As previously stated, the American legal system has
traditionally failed to protect the moral rights of artists, offering
protection only for artists' economic rights.' 9 In recent years,
9. Merryman, The Refrigeratorof Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS LJ. 1023, 1043 (1976).
10. See infra note 20 (listing relevant state statutes).
11. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-650, §§ 601-610, 104 Stat. 5089,
5128-33 (1990).
12. I- § 610(a), 104 Stat. at 5132 (1990).
13. Id. § 605,104 Stat. at 5131 (1990) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 301(f(1)). See infra notes 320396 and accompanying text (discussion of preemption of state law by the Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990).
14. See infra notes 19-166 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 25-102 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 103-148 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 167-319 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 320-396 and accompanying text.
19. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of the United States
legal system to protect the moral rights of artists).
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however the legislatures of several states have enacted statutes
protecting artists' moral rights. 20 The first state to enact such a
statute was California, in 1979.21 In 1984, the New York
Legislature followed suit and enacted statutes protecting artists'
moral rights. 22 Between 1985 and 1989, several other states
enacted similar statutes.' These statutes are roughly analogous to
either the California statute, which focuses upon the preservation
of art for the public good, as well as the protection of the artist's
reputation, or the New York statute, which seems to focus
exclusively on the protection of the artist's professional reputation.
Since these statutes are largely patterned after the California24 and
New York statutes, and because in-depth analysis of each of these
other statutes is beyond the scope of this Article, this portion of the
Article will largely focus upon the provisions of the California and
New York moral rights statutes.

20. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 987-989 (West Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
42-116s - 42-116t (West Supp. 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2151-2156 (West 1987); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1988); MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West Supp. 1991);
NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 598.970-598.978 (1989); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A-2 - 2A:24A-8 (West
1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-1 - 14-4B-3 (1988); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03
(McKinney Supp. 1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110 (Purdon Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN.
LAws §§ 5-62-2 - 5-62-6 (1987). See generally Petrovich, Artists' Statutory Droit Moral in
California: A Critical Appraisal, 15 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 29 (1981); Comment, California Art
PreservationAct: A Safe Hamletfor "Moral Rights" in the U.S., 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 975 (1981);
Koven, Observationson the MassachusettsArtPreservationAct,71 MAss. L. REv. 101 (1986); Note,
Intellectual Property-Artists' Droit Moral, 1989 PAc. Li. REV. NEv. LES. 177 (1989); Damich,
The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: A Comparative Critique, 84 CotruM. L. REv. 1733
(1984); Comment, The New YorkArtists'AuthorshipRightsAct: IncreasedProtectionandEnhanced
Status For Visual Artists, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 158 (1984) (discussions of recent moral rights
statutory enactments).
21. 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 409, § 1 (enacting CAL. Civ. CODE § 987); 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 1517,
§ 3 (enacting CAL. Civ. CODE § 989).
22. 1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 849, § 1 (enacting N.Y. ARTS & CUrLT. AFF. LAW § 14.03).
23. See 1988 Conn. Pub. Acts 88-284, §§ 1-8; 1986 La. Acts no. 599, § 1; 1985 Me. Laws
ch. 382; 1985 Mass. Acts ch. 488, § 1; 1989 Nev. Stat. cbs. 192-193; 1986 NJ. Laws cl. 97, §§ 1-8;
1987 N.M. Laws ch. 70, §§ 1-3; 1986 Pa. Laws 1502, no.1 161, §§ 1-10; 1987 R. Pub. Laws ch.
566, § 1. See also supra note 20 (list of statutes enacted by these legislative acts).
24. See DaSilva, supra note 1, at 51 (predicting that the California statute would -serve as
a model for other, more comprehensive statutory schemes for protecting authors' and artists* rights").
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A. The CaliforniaMoral Rights Statute
California's protection for the moral rights of visual artists is
found in California Civil Code sections 987 and 989.' The
California Legislature, in enacting the statutes, declared that "the
physical alteration or destruction of fine art, which is an expression
of the artist's personality, is detrimental to the artist's reputation,
and artists therefore have an interest in protecting their works of
fine art against any alteration or destruction, and that there is also
a public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic
creations." 26 The substantive provisions of California's moral
rights statute are set forth below.
1. Protected Subject Matter
The California statutes protect only those works which qualify
as "fine art." '27 For actions brought by the artist or his or her
representative to enforce the artist's rights, works created under
contract for use by the purchaser in advertising or print or

25. See CAL CIv. CODE §§ 987, 989 (West Supp. 1991). California offers other protections
to visual artists, including a droit de suite, which is an artist's right to royalties on a purchaser's
resale of the work. At § 986 (West Supp. 1991). For a commentary critical of the validity of section
986, see Comment, Droit de Suite: Only Congress Can Grant Royalty Protection For Artists, 9
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 111 (1981).
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a) (West Supp. 1991). Compare Id. (destruction of a work damages
artist's reputation) with Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570,576, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813,
819 (1949) (destruction of work does not damage artist's reputation). While the bill enacting Civil
Code section 987 was being considered in the legislature, the author of the bill was quoted as stating:
To destroy or alter a work of art is offensive to the artist and detrimental to the artist's
reputation. The need for legislation in this area can be seen [from] the case of an
Alexander Calder mobile painted "Calder red" which was donated to the Pittsburgh
airport. The Airport Commission hung the mobile differently and repainted it in the colors
of Pittsburgh, green and gold. When Calder discovered the changes, he was furious but
had no legal remedy.
Levine, Legislature Gets Three Art Bills, LA. Times, May 5, 1979, § 2, at 9, col. I (quoting
California State Senator Alan Sieroty (D-West Los Angeles), author of Senate Bill 668, the bill
enacting Civil Code section 987).
27. CAL Civ. CODE §§ 987(c)-(d), 989(c), (e) (West Supp. 1991).

450

1992 / The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
28
electronic media are excluded from the definition of "fine art."
This exclusion from the definition of "fine art" does not apply to
actions brought by a nonprofit organization acting in the public
interest to preserve a work of art.29
The types of items which may be classified as fine art are
limited to paintings, sculptures, drawings, or works in glass.3" The
definition of "fine art" encompasses only originals, not copies or
reproductions.3" Additionally, the work must be one "of
recognized quality." 32 The statute mandates that the trier of fact
rely on the expert opinions of persons knowledgeable about fine
art, such as "artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art, [and]
curators of art museums," in determining whether the art is "of
recognized quality.", 33 For actions brought by organizations acting
in the public interest to enjoin the destruction or alteration of art,
the work must be not only of recognized quality but also "of
substantial public interest.,34
The "of recognized quality" standard seems troubling in its
application. A particular work may lose the protection of the
statutes merely because certain "experts" do not find the work
35
aesthetically pleasing or do not recognize the value of the work

28. 1& § 987(b)(2) (West Supp. 1991). The language of the statute excludes works prepared
under contract "for commercial use." d "'Commercial use" is defined as 'fine art created under
a work-for-hire arrangement for use in advertising, magazines, newspapers, or other print and
electronic media." Ict§ 987(b)C7) (West Supp. 1991). Courts may narrowly construe the definition
of "works of fine art" in this respect. In one case, the court held that architectural plans and
drawings did not fit within the definition of "fine art," because they were prepared "in the
commercial context." Robert H. Jacobs, Inc. v. Westoaks Realtors, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d 637, 644,
205 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624 (1984). This holding does not seem to be in accord with the plain language
of the statute defining "commercial use." At best, this is a broad interpretation of the statute; at
worst the court was simply wrong.
29. CAL CIV. CODE § 989(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
30. CAL CrV. CODE §§ 987(b)(2), 989(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991). The statute as originally
enacted did not include works of glass in the definition of fine art. See 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 409, § 1
(enacting CAL_ Civ. CODE § 987). Works of glass were added to the statutory definition of fine art
in 1982. See 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 1517, § 2 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 987); id. § 3 (enacting CAL.
CIv. CODE § 989).
31. Md.§§ 987(b)(2), 989(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
32. Id.
33. Id § 987(f) (West Supp. 1991).
34.
d § 989(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
35. See Sarraute, supra note 1, at 482 (allowing judges or juries to determine the
"significance' of a work of art may infringe the artist's rights).
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Although this standard has been adopted by a few other
jurisdictions,36 the standard possesses the potential to chill artists'
freedom of expression and creativity by penalizing them for
attempting new or unknown techniques or themes. As Justice
Holmes observed nearly ninety years ago, "It would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves the final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits." 3
Other jurisdictions limit the definition of "fine art" in other
ways, such as by requiring the work to have a minimum appraised
value,38 or merely requiring that the work be produced in a
limited edition of less than three hundred copies.39 The Senate
Judiciary Committee report on the bill enacting the California
moral rights statute stated the justification for the standard as
follows: "Nothing changes more drastically than fashions in art.
Today's trash is tomorrow's masterpiece, and vice versa. Thus, a
person who honestly thought he was dealing with worthless junk
could . . . find himself sued for mistreating fine art." 4 The
Assembly Judiciary Committee acknowledged, however, that the
proposed standard was less than ideal, stating:
To determine whether a work of fine art is of "recognized quality," the
trier of fact would rely on the opinions of artists, art dealers, collectors
of fine art, curators of art museums, and other persons involved with the

creation or marketing of fine art. Notwithstanding this provision, would
the trier of fact be likely to encounter special problems when there is
a conflict in the opinions of the experts? Not all the experts consulted

might agree that the work has "recognized quality." What may be
considered trash today could be a masterpiece tomorrow. It is conceded

36. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2152(4), (7) (West 1987); MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. §
85S(b), (f) (West Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-2(B) (1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §
2102 (Purdon Supp. 1991).
37. Bleistein v. Donaldson lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
38. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116s(2) (West Supp. 1991) (only works with a
value of at least $2,500 are "works of fine art").
39. See, e.g., Mn. RL v. STAT. ANN. tit 27, § 303(i)(D) (1988); NaV. Rev. STAT. § 598.970(3)
(1989); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-3(e) (West 1987); RI. GEN. LAWs § 5-62-2(e) (1987).
40. SENATE CoMM. ON JUDICIARY, REPORT ON SB 668, at 2 (May 17, 1979).
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that had this measure existed as law during41vanGogh's lifetime, his

work would not have enjoyed its protection.

Given the comments and concerns noted above, it appears that the
standard employed by the California statutes is not the best
available alternative. Fortunately, since the new federal Visual
Artists Rights Act does not incorporate this standard, at least with
respect to actions for the modification, mutilation, or distortion of
art, artists may be able to avoid the harsh application of the
California "of recognized quality" standard by turning to the
federal statute for relief.42
2. Scope of the Artist's Rights
The California moral rights statute includes a right of paternity.
The statute grants the artist the right to claim authorship for his or
her work.43 The statute also grants the artist a right of disavowal,
in other words, the right to disclaim authorship of his or her
work.44 However, this right is limited in that the artist may only
disclaim authorship "for a just and valid reason." 45 The statute
does not define this term, and there is no reported California case
interpreting the term. Interpretation of what constitutes "a just and
valid reason" may therefore require a court to analyze European
civil law interpretations of this right.
In Europe, there are two situations in which the right of
disavowal is generally enforced. First, the artist can prevent the use
of his or her name in connection with an advertisement

41.

ASSEiBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, REPORT ON SB 668, at 4 (May 31, 1979).

42. See Pub. L No. 101-650, § 602, 104 Stat. 5089,5128 (1990) (amending 17 U.S.C. 101).
See also infra notes 193-221 and accompanying text (discussing the federal definition of "work of
visual art").
43. CAL. Cv. CoDE § 987(d) (West Supp. 1991). Compare Ld.
with Vargas v. Esquire, Inc.,
164 F.2d 522, 524 (7th Cir. 1947), cert denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948) (absent a contrary contractual
provision, artist could not force purchaser of the work to attribute creation of the work to artist).
44. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(d) (West Supp. 1991).
45. Id
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incorporating the work.4 6 Second, the artist may prevent the use
of his or her name in connection with distorted or mutilated
works.47 However, European advocates of moral rights often stress
that the rights are uniquely personal in that the artist instills part of
his or her personality in the work at the time of the creation of the
work, and for this reason the artist should be the sole arbiter of
whether the work remains worthy of his or her name. 48 The "just
and valid reason" requirement of the California statute does not
exist in French law. 49 Thus, in this respect, the California statute
falls short of the protection offered by its civil law counterparts by
forcing the artist to convince the finder of fact that disavowal of
the work is justified.
The California statute includes a right of integrity. This right
statutorily prohibits the intentional" "physical defacement,
mutilation, alteration, or destruction" of a protected work, except
by the artist who holds both ownership and possession of the
work.5 ' If the person52 or entity who causes the destruction or

46. DaSilva, supranote 1, at 28. Of course, as discussed above, works that are prepared under
contract for use in an advertisement do not constitute "fine art" under the California statute. CAL.
CIv. CODE § 987(b)(2) (West Supp. 1991). See supranotes 27-42 and accompanying text (discussion
of the definition of "f'me art" under the statute). Therefore, only those works not originally designed
to be part of an advertisement, but later incorporated into an advertisement without the artist's
permission, could be subject to this right.
47. Comment, Moral Rights for Artists Under the Lanham Act: Gilliam v. American
Broadcasting Co., 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 595, 597 (1977).
48. See Marvin, The Author's Status in the United Kingdom andFrance: Common Law and
the MoralRights Doctrine, 20 INT'L Comp. LQ. 675,678-79 (1971) (discussing the personal nature
of moral rights).
49. Damich, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: A Comparative Critique, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 1743 (1984).
50. The statute does not define the term "'intentional." Therefore, it is unknown whether, in
order to violate the statute, an individual need only know that he or she is committing an act or
defacement or destruction, or additionally whether the individual must know that the work falls into
the statutory definition of "fine art." See generally KEETON, DOBBS, KEETON & OVIEN, PROSSER
& KEETON ON TORTS 33-37 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) (general discussion on the meaning of the
term "intent" in relation to tort law).
51. CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(c)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
52. See id. § 987(b)(3) (West Supp. 1991) (the term "person- includes natural persons,
partnerships, corporations, and other groups or organizations).
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mutilation of the work is one who frames,5 3 conserves, 5 4 or
restores55 the work, grossly negligent acts are actionable by the
artist." Unlike the New York moral rights statute,57 the
California statute however does not address the matter of mutilation
or destruction of the work occasioned by the owner of the work's
negligence in maintaining and caring for the work. One
commentator has stated his belief that the omission of such a
provision from the California statutes renders such situations not
actionable.58 If this is an accurate interpretation, museums and
private collectors could avoid liability for improperly maintaining
or negligently damaging works of art."
An action to protect the right of integrity may, of course, be
brought by the artist.' Additionally, a public or private nonprofit
organization which promotes the interests of art may, if acting for
the benefit of the public interest, bring an action for injunctive
relief to prevent the mutilation or destruction of a work of fine
art."' The court may require the nonprofit organization to post a
reasonable bond.62

53. See id § 987(b)(4) (West Supp. 1991) (defining "frame" as "to prepare, or cause to be
prepared, a work of fine art for display in a manner customarily considered to be appropriate for a
work of fine art in the particular medium"). Thus, persons who mount sculptures on bases, matte
drawings, or install stained glass windows would presumably fall within the definition of"framers."
54. See id § 987(b)(6) (West Supp. 1991) (stating that to "conserve'" means to "preserve.
* . a work of fine art by retarding or preventing deterioration or damage through appropriate
treatment").
55. See id § 987(b)(5) (West Supp. 1991) (defining "'restore").
56. Id § 987(c)(2) (West Supp. 1991). The statute defines "'gross negligence" as "the
exercise of so slight a degree of care as to justify the belief that there was an indifference to the
particular work of fine art." l.
57. See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. Ar'F. LAw § 14.03(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (making the
grossly negligent failure to prevent natural deterioration of the work of art caused by the passage of
time a violation of the moral rights statute).
58. Damich, supra note 49, at 1746-47.
59. Id at 1747.
60. CAL. CiV. CODE § 987(e) (West Supp. 1991). See infra notes 92-97 and accompanying
text (discussing the remedies available to the artist).
61. Id § 989(c) (West Supp. 1991). The organization must be one which had been in
existence for at least three years at the time the action is filed. Id § 989(b)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
Additionally, "a major purpose" of the organization must be to "stage, display, or otherwise present
works of art to the public or to promote the interests of the arts or artists." Id
62. Id § 989(0(2) (West Supp. 1991).
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3. Durationand Waiver of the Rights
The rights and duties created by the California moral rights
statute are enforceable by the artist during his or her lifetime.63 If
the artist is deceased, the fights may be enforced by the artist's
beneficiary, devisee, or personal representative.64 These rights are
enforceable until the fiftieth anniversary of the artist's death.65
The statute applies to works of art created before or after the
effective date of the statute, whether the artist was living or dead
at the time of enactment of the statute.66
For actions brought by public interest organizations to enjoin
the destruction or alteration of works of art, the duration of the
right of enforcement is unclear from the text of the statute. Civil
Code section 989, which creates a right of enforcement by public
interest corporations, incorporates by reference the language of
Civil Code section 987, which creates rights of artists to prevent
mutilation or destruction of their work. 67 It is unclear whether the
incorporation of section 987 also incorporates the limitations of the
statute, such as the expiration of rights on the fiftieth anniversary
of the artist's death,6" or whether the rights last in perpetuity.
Interpreting the statute granting rights to public interest
organizations as expiring fifty years after the artist's death seems
inconsistent with the statutory scheme. The legislature has declared
that the provisions granting rights to artists are intended to protect
the rights of the artist,' and the explicit intent of the statute in

63.

Id. § 987(g)(1) (West Supp. 1991).

64.
65.

I1.
Id.

65. Id § 9870) (West Supp. 1991). However, the statute only applies to acts committed on
or after the effective date of the statute, January 1, 1980. Id
67. Id § 989(c) (West Supp. 1991). The statute reads, in relevant part: "An organization
acting in the public interest may commence an action for injunctive relief to preserve or restore the
integrity of a work of art from acts prohibited by subdivision (c) of Section 987." Id Section 987(c)
is the provision prohibiting destruction or alteration of the work by anyone except the author. Id §
987(c) (West Supp. 1991).
68. See id § 987(g)(1) (West Supp. 1991) (expiration of rights).
69. See id § 987(a) (West Supp. 1991) (stating that, while the public has an interest in
preserving works of art, the primary intent of the statute was to prevent harm to the artist's

reputation).
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granting rights to public interest organizations is to protect the
"public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic
creations." ' 71 Consequently, while a limitation of rights based on
the lifespan of the artist is justified for the purpose of protecting
the individual artist's interests, such a limitation is not justified
when protecting the interests of society as a whole. This view is
supported by an Assembly Judiciary Committee report on the bill
enacting Civil Code section 989, the statute granting rights to
public interest organizations. The report stated:
Under existing law, an artist, and his estate for fifty years after the
artist's death, may bring an action against any person who intentionally
alters or destroys a work of fine art of recognized quality. However,
members of the public have no such right to protect works of fine art
which are of substantial public interest. Art may therefore be subject to
alteration or destruction aftertheffty yearperiodofprotectionafforded
by current law or if the artist does not care or has no representatives.
The author of [the bill] claims that the bill is necessary because
"[w]orks of fime art are more than economic commodities and they
oftentimes provide our communities with a sense of cohesion and
history ...

."

should be able to preserve their
[O]ur communities
1

heritage when it is in jeopardy.

7

Given the Judiciary Committee's concerns, it is surprising that the
text of section 989 does not explicitly state that the "fifty years
after the artist's death" expiration date does not apply. However,
given the above indications of legislative intent, it is likely that
courts would construe the rights of enforcement by public interests
organizations as lasting in perpetuity.
For all actions, regardless of the identity of the plaintiff, there
is a limitation period of three years after the commission of the act
complained of, or one year after the discovery of the act,
whichever is longer.72

70.
71.
(emphasis
72.

Id. § 989(a) (West Supp. 1991).
ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JuDICIARY, COM!rrrEE REPORT ON SB 1757, at 2 (June 18, 1982)
added) (omissions in original).
CAT. CIV. CoDE §§ 987(i), 989(g) (West Supp. 1991).
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Unlike the rights created by the French droit moral, waivers of
which are ineffective and unenforceable,73 the rights created under
the California moral rights statutes may be waived by the artist.74
However, such a waiver is void unless the waiver is expressly set
forth in a written instrument signed by the artist.75 The issue of
whether such a waiver is effective to bar claims by organizations
acting in the public interest has never been litigated, and remains
an open question. Valid policy reasons exist for justifying
resolution of the question either way: It seems unfair for a
purchaser of art who has gone to the trouble of obtaining a valid
waiver from the artist to be subject to claims by third parties; on
the other hand, allowing artists to waive the rights of the public at
large seems inconsistent with the legislature's intent to protect
works of art for future generations. The resolution of this issue
awaits a judicial determination at some future date.
4. Special Provisions for Works of Art Incorporated Into
Buildings
The California statutes have special provisions concerning
works of fine art that have been incorporated into real property.76
The special provisions relate to the rights concerning destruction or
mutilation of the work, and do not affect the artist's right to claim
or disclaim authorship.'
]For actions brought by the artist or his or her representative, if
the work of fine art is affixed in such a manner that the work
cannot be removed from the building without substantial damage
to or alteration of the work, the right to prevent destruction or

73. See Lewis, PartII, supra note 1, at 12 (contractual provisions waiving the artist's drolit
moral are void).
74. CAL Cv. CODE § 987(g)(3) (West Supp. 1991).
75. l. There are special rules for artwork which has been incorporated into a building. See
id § 987(h)(1) (West Supp. 1991). See also infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (discussing the
special waiver provision of section 987(h)(1)).
76. CAL- CIV. CODE §§ 987(h), 989(e) (West Supp. 1991).

77.

Id § 987(h)(4) (West Supp. 1991). See supra notes 44 - 49 and accompanying text

(discussing the artist's right under the California statute to claim or disclaim authorship of a work

of fime art).
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alteration is deemed to be waived, unless the artist specifically
reserves his or her rights in a written instrument signed by the
owner of the building.78 If properly recorded, the instrument is
binding on all subsequent owners of the building. 79 If the work
can be removed without substantial damage or alteration to the
work, but the owner of the real property intends to remove the
work in a manner likely to cause damage or alteration, the owner
of the building must employ reasonable diligence to attempt to
notify the artist, or, if the artist is deceased, the artist's heirs or
personal representative, of the impending action.8" If the owner of
the real property fails to attempt to notify the artist or his or her
representative and then removes the work of art, the owner is fully
liable for any damage or alteration of the work."' If the owner of
the real estate is successful in contacting the artist or the artist's
representative, the artist or his or her representative has ninety days
to remove the art or to pay for its removal.8 2 If the artist does so,
title to the work of art passes to the artist.8 3 The owner of the
building must provide similar notice, and the artist has a similar
right to remove the work, if the owner of the building plans to
demolish a building without removing a work of art that could be
removed without substantial damage or alteration to the work of
art. 4 The owner of the real estate is fully liable for his or her
failure to provide such notice. 5
For actions brought by organizations acting in the public
interest, the artist has no rights if the work cannot be removed from
the real estate without substantial damage or alteration to the
work. 6 If the organization believes that the work can be removed
without causing damage or alteration, the organization may bring

78. CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(h)(1) (West Supp. 1991). The instrument must contain a legal
description of the property. Id Additionally, the instrument must be recorded. Id
79. Id
80. Id § 987(h)(2) (West Supp. 1991). The notification must be in writing. Id
81. Id
82. M,
83. Id
84. Id § 987(h)(3) (West Supp. 1991).
85. Id
86. Id § 989(e)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
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an injunctive action, but the organization has the burden of
proof.'7 If the work can be removed without substantial damage
or alteration, but the owner of the real property intends to remove
it in a manner likely to cause damage or alteration to the work, and
if the artist fails to take action after the owner attempted to provide
notice, then the owner must provide thirty days public notice of his
or her intent to remove the art.88 Within the thirty day period, a
public interest organization may agree to pay for the removal of the
art.9 If the organization does pay for the removal, title to the
work passes to the organization." If neither the artist nor an
organization agrees to take any action to protect the work, the
owner may remove the work as planned. 9
5. Remedies
If the artist's statutory rights are violated, he or she may bring
an action for injunctive relief' and/or actual money damages. 93
Punitive damages may be assessed against the defendant to the
same extent such damages would be available in other civil actions
in California," except that the court must select an organization
engaged in educational or charitable activities in the area of fine
arts in California to receive the punitive damages. 95 The artist, but

87. Id.
88. Id § 989(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1991). The notice must appear in a newspaper of general
circulation in the area where the art is located. Id The notice must be in the form of a display ad.

Id The notice may run concurrently with the owner's attempt to notify the artist. Id
89. Id § 989(e)(2)(A)i) (West Supp. 1991). The removal must be completed within 90 days
of the start of the 30 day notice period. Id
90. Id § 989(e)(2)(A)Cii) (West Supp. 1991).
91. Id § 989(e)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1991).
92. Id § 987(e)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
93. Id § 987(e)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
94. See id § 3294 (West Supp. 1991) (standards for assessing punitive damages in civil
actions). In California, civil defendants in noncontract actions may be liable for punitive damages

when the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has acted with
oppression, fraud, or malice. Id § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1991). The term "malice" is defimed as
despicable conduct that the defendant intentionally or recklessly commits. Id § 3294(c)(1) (Vest
Supp. 1991).
95. Id § 987(e)(3) (West Supp. 1991).
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not the defendant, may recover attorneys' fees and expert witness
fees.96 The court may provide any other relief it deems proper. 97
For actions brought by organizations acting in the public
interest, the organization's remedy is limited to injunctive relief.98
However, the court may award attorneys' and expert witness fees
to the prevailing party. 99
6. Severability of Provisions
The California Moral Rights statutes include express
severability provisions." The severability provisions provide that
if any portion of the statutes are held invalid, such a holding will
not affect the validity of other provisions that can be given effect
without the invalid provision. 1 ' Since several provisions of the
California moral rights provisions may be preempted by the federal
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, these severability provisions are
highly significant.
B. The New York Moral Rights Statute
New York's moral rights statute was enacted in its present form
in 1984,'02 and became effective on January 1, 1985.103 It has
been suggested that the enactment of the New York legislation was
inspired by the Bank of Tokyo's act of cutting up and removing a
massive sculpture by Isamo Noguchi from the bank's Wall Street
office without notifying the artist."' 4 Although Noguchi was
quoted by the New York Times as stating that the act constituted

96. Id. § 987(e)(4) (West Supp. 1991).
97. Id § 987(e)(5) (West Supp. 1991).
98. Id § 989(c) (West Supp. 1991).
99. Id § 989(f(1) (West Supp. 1991).
100. See id §§ 987(k), 989(i) (West Supp. 1991).
101. Id §§ 987(k), 989(i) (West Supp. 1991).
102. See 1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 849, § 1 (enacting N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03). An
earlier version was enacted in 1983 and repealed in 1984. See 1983 N.Y. Laws ch. 994, § 3 (enacting
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. APP. LAW §§ 14.51-14.59) (repealed by 1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 849, § 1).
103. N.Y. ARTs & CULT. APP. LAW § 14.03(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
104. Damich, supra note 49, at 1733.
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"vandalism,"' ° New York law at the time of the act (1980)
provided Noguchi with no relief."°6
While several provisions of the New York law are similar or
identical to the previously examined California statutes, there are
significant differences between the New York and California
statutes. The discussion below sets forth the specific provisions of
the New York statute.
1. ProtectedSubject Matter
While the California statute protects only original works of
art,"°7 the New York statute protects the rights of the author of
"a work of fine art or limited edition multiple of not more than
three hundred copies by that artist or a reproduction thereof." 10 8
In the definition of "fine art," New York includes paintings,
sculptures, drawings, works of graphic art, and nonmultiple
prints." 9 Motion pictures are specifically excluded from the
protection of the New York statute," 0 as are works prepared
under contract for advertising or commercial use, absent a
contractual provision to the contrary."' Unlike the California
statute, this standard of protected subject matter does not require
the trier of fact to engage in a subjective value judgment
concerning the quality of the work."'

N.Y. Times, April
105. Id (quoting Glueek, Bank Cuts Up Noguchi Sculpture and Stores It,
19, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 4).
106. Id
107. CAL. Qv. CODE § 987(b)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
108. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AlF. LAW § 14.03(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991). See supra note 39
(listing statutes from other jurisdictions with analogous provisions).
109. N.Y. ARTS & CuLT. AFF. LAW § 11.01(9) (MeKinney Supp. 1991).
110. d § 14.03(1) (MeKinney Supp. 1991).
111. Id. § 14.03(3)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
112. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (explaining and criticizing the California
"of recognized quality" standard).
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2. Scope of the Artist's Rights
Like California, New York law protects the artist's right of
paternity.113 The statute gives the artist the unlimited right to
claim authorship of a work of art, and to have his or her name
appear in connection with the work.114 Additionally, the artist has
the right to disclaim authorship of the work.115 As with the
California statute,116 this right of disavowal is limited to
situations in which the artist has a "just and valid reason" to
disclaim authorship.' 17 While this standard is subject to the same
shortcomings as the California standard,"1 the New York statute
provides some guidance as to what constitutes a "just and valid
reason." The statute specifies that a "[j]ust and valid reason for
disclaiming authorship shall include that the work has been altered,
defaced, mutilated or modified other than by the artist, without the
artist's consent, and damage to the artist's reputation is reasonably
likely to result or has resulted therefrom."" ' 9 Since the statute
specifies that the definition of a just and valid reason "includes,"
rather than "is limited to" the above situation, it seems likely that
other scenarios may constitute just and valid cause. 2 ' It also
seems, however, that the focus of the statute is the damage to the
artist's reputation. Both the right of paternity provision 121 and the
right of integrity provision"z focus on the possibility of harm to

113. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
114. Id
115. Id
116. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(d) (West Supp. 1991) (right of disavowal).
117. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
118. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (criticizing the -just and valid reason"
standard).
119. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
120. For example, incorporation of the work in an advertising campaign to promote a product
or idea that the artist finds objectionable might arguably constitute a "just and valid reason."See,
e.g., Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 131-41, (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (inclusion
of artist's works in a pamphlet designed to stop public funding of the National Endowment for the
Arts violated artist's rights under the New York statute).
121. See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFP. LAW § 14.03(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
122. See id § 14.03(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (right of integrity). See also infra notes 123131 and accompanying text (discussion of the right of integrity under New York law).
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the artist's reputation.123 It is likely, therefore, that for an artist
to prove that he or she has a "just and valid reason" to disclaim
authorship, the artist will have to prove that continuing to claim
authorship would be likely to damage his or her reputation.
Similar to the California statute, the New York statute includes
a right of integrity.

24

As stated above, the focus of this provision

seems to be on the prevention of harm to the artist's reputation.
Unlike the California statute, which prohibits the act of destroying
or defacing a work of art," the New York statute only prohibits
the unauthorized public display or publication of an altered,
defaced, mutilated, or modified work of art. 12' Additionally, the
display of such works of art is only prohibited if the work is
displayed or published in a manner that is likely to be regarded as
the work of the artist, and damage to the artist's reputation would
necessarily result.127 Such a standard, focusing exclusively on
protection of the artist's reputation, ignores the very real public
interest in preventing the alteration or destruction of fine art for the
benefit of future generations.
The New York statute granting the right of integrity specifies
as a standard of culpability that the defendant need only act
"knowingly. ' 128 Two exceptions exist with regard to this
standard of culpability. First, alteration or defacement of a work
caused by the inherent nature of its materials, or resulting from the
passage of time, does not constitute a violation, unless the
alteration or defacement is the result of gross negligence. 29 Not
only is the artist precluded from preventing or seeking
compensation for such non-negligent defacement or alteration, the
artist may not disclaim authorship on this basis. 130 Second,

123. N.Y. ARTs & CuLT. AFF.LAW § 14.03(1)-(2) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
124. See id § 14.03(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (right of integrity).
125. See CAL.. Cv. CODE § 987(c) (West Supp. 1991) (right of integrity).
126. N.Y. ART & CuLT. AFF. LAw § 14.03(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991). Only display,
publication, or reproduction occurring in the state of New York are prohibited. Id.
127. ld.
128. Id.
129. Id. § 14.03(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
130. Id.
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conservation"'1 may not constitute an alteration or acts of
defacement
32
manner. 1

unless the acts are undertaken

in a negligent

It is significant that the New York statute, on its face, does not
prohibit the destructionof works of art. Presumably, the legislature
believed that the destruction of a work does not damage an artist's
reputation, whereas the display of altered works, which may not be
reflective of the artist's true abilities, may damage the artist's

reputation. Some commentators would probably believe that this
view is in accord with the French civil law doctrine of droit
moral.'33 Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that the New York statute
does not protect, and does not purport to protect, the public policy
of preserving works of art for the cultural enrichment of society as

a whole.' 34 Although such a statutory intent may be inconsistent
with the civil law droit moral,13

some states, most notably

California, have recognized that promotion of the public interest in
the preservation of art is highly desirable. The difference in the
focus of the California and New York statutes is evident even from
the title of the acts; while the New York statute is captioned

131. See id. § 11.01(7) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (defining "conservation" as "acts undertaken
to correct deterioration and alteration and acts taken to prevent, stop, or retard deterioration).
132. Id. § 14.03(3)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
133. See, e.g., Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors,
and Creators,53 HAgv. L. REv. 554,569 (1940). In discussing the civil law version of moral rights,
the author stated:
The right to prevent deformation does not include the right to prevent destruction of a
created work. The doctrine of moral rights finds social basis in the need of the creator for
protection of his honor and reputation. To deform his work is to present him to the public
as the creator of a work not his own, and thus make him subject to criticism for work he
has not done; the destruction of his work does not have this result.
Id. See also Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570,573, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 816 (1949)
(destruction of a mural painted by plaintiff did not damage plaintiff's reputation as an artist).
134. See 1983 N.Y. Laws ch. 994, § 1 (preamble to legislation enacting the original New York
moral rights statute, stating that protecting works of fine art is crucial -to the artist and the artist's
reputation"). Compare id with CAL. Cv. CODE §§ 987(a), 989(a) (West Supp. 1991) (legislative
declaration of the public interest in the preservation of works of art).
135. See Damich,supra note 49, at 1748-49 (the French droitmoraldoesnot protect the public
interest, but solely protects the artist's rights).
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" 6 the California statute is captioned
".hatists Authorship Rights,"13
"Preservation of Works of Art.' 37
Enactment of the New York moral rights statute was potentially
inspired by the Bank of Tokyo's destruction of the Noguchi
sculpture displayed in the Wall Street branch of the bank. 3
Ironically, Noguchi would be in no better position had the act of
destruction occurred after the enactment of the New York statute,
since the bank destroyed the sculpture and placed it in storage, but
did not display the sculpture in a mutilated condition. Since the
statute requires public display for liability to attach, Noguchi would
not have been afforded relief. The New York statutory scheme,
therefore, may not accomplish its drafters' intentions.

3. Durationof the Rights
Whereas the California statute expressly provides the duration
of the rights accorded to an artist,139 the New York statute does
not do so. However, since the New York statute was intended to
protect the personal reputational rights of the artist,140 it is a
logical assumption that the statutory rights do not last beyond the
life of the artist. The New York statute contains a limitations
period, similar to that of the California statute, mandating that an
action must be brought within three years of the act complained of,
or within one year of the date of discovery of the act, whichever
is longer. 4 ' However, under the California statute, the one-year
period begins after "discovery"' 42 of the destructive act, whereas
the New York statute provides that the one-year limitations period

136. See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFP. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
137. See CAL.. Civ. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1991).
138. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text (discussing the destruction of the Noguchi

sculpture).
139.

See CAL.. CIV. CODE § 987(g)(1) (West Supp. 1991) (duration of rights). See also supra

notes 64-72 and accompanying text (discussion of the duration of rights under the California moral
rights statute).
140. See supra notes 119-126 and accompanying text (disussing the personal nature of the

rights created by the New York moral rights statute).
141.
142.
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CA.. CIV. CODE §§ 987(1), 939(g) (West Supp. 1991).
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begins on the date of "constructive discovery" of the destructive
act. 143
4. Remedies
The New York moral rights statute does not provide the scope
of available remedies. The statute simply states the "artist
aggrieved under [the statute] shall have a cause of action for legal
and injunctive relief.' 44 No specific mention is made in the
statute of the availability of punitive damages, but punitive
damages are generally available in New York when a defendant's
acts exhibit a high degree of moral culpability. 45 However, early
drafts of the bill explicitly included a provision for the award of
punitive damages, but this provision was amended out of the bill
prior to its passage. 146 Therefore, the elimination of this provision
from the bill can reasonably be interpreted as an attempt to
discourage awards of punitive damages for violations of the New
York moral rights statute. 147
Contrary to the California statute, there is no discussion of
attorneys' fees in the New York statute. Accordingly, it appears
that each party is required to bear its own attorneys' fees.

143.

N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAw § 14.03(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).

No existing New York case law defines the term "constructive discovery" in the context of this
statute.
144. Id. § 14.03(4)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
145. See Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, (1961)
(considering when punitive damages should be available, and what procedures should be followed
in awarding such damages). In Walker, the New York Court of Appeals held that punitive damages
may be awarded "'in cases where the wrong complained of is morally culpable, oris actuated by evil
and reprehensible motives, not only to punish the defendant but to deter him, as well as others who
might otherwise be so prompted, from indulging in similar conduct in the future." Id at 404, 179
N.E.2d at 498, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
146. Comment, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: Increased Protection and
Enhanced Statusfor Vsual Artists, 70 CORNELL L REV. 158, 178 (1984).

147. Id
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C. Other States
Although the California and New York statutes represent the
first statutory schemes to be enacted in the United States protecting
artists' moral rights, several other states have since enacted similar
statutes. 148 These statutes are roughly evenly divided between the
California type of protection and the New York type of statutory
scheme.
States which have enacted statutes which, like the New York
statute, protect the artist's reputation 149 include Louisiana, 504
53 and Rhode Island. 15
Maine,' 5 ' Nevada, 2 New Jersey,'
These statutes vary from the New York statute only in minor
details, if at all.
States which have enacted statutes apparently patterned after the
California statute include Connecticut, 155 Massachusetts, 156 New
Mexico, 57 and Pennsylvania. 15 These statutes create a cause
of action for the artist or the artist's representative that is
essentially identical to the California statute, including the right to
bring an action within fifty years of the artist's death. 5 9 Further,
these statutes, with the exception of the Connecticut statute, require

148. See supra notes 20-23 (listing various moral rights statutes and legislative enactments).
149. See supra notes 102-148 and accompanying text (discussing the New York moral rights
statute).
150. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2152-2155 (West 1987).
151. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (1988).
152. See NEV. RnV. STAT. §§ 598.970-598.978 (1989). See also Note, IntellectualPropertyArtists' Droit Moral, 1989 PAc. L. REv. NEv. LEOIS. 177 (1989) (discussion of the provisions of
the Nevada moral rights statute).
153. See NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A-1 - 2A:24A-8 (West 1987).
154. See I. GEN. LAws §§ 5-62-2 - 5-62-6 (1987).
155. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-116s - 42-116t (West Supp. 1991).
156. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. § 85S (West Supp. 1991). See also Koven, Observationson
the Massachusetts Art Preservation Act, 71 MASS. L RaY. 101 (1986) (discussion of the
Massachusetts moral rights statute).
157. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-1 - 13-4B-3 (1988).
158. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110 (Purdon Supp. 1991).
159. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116t(d) (West Supp. 1991); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. §
85S(g) (West Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-3(E) (1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2107(1)
(Purdon Supp. 1991).
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the work to be "of recognized quality,"' 6 while the Connecticut
statute requires the work to have a market value of at least $2,500
to qualify as "fine art."' 161 However, with the exception of
Massachusetts, the statutes do not grant a public interest
organization the right to sue.
The Massachusetts statute is the only statute embodying a
provision even remotely similar to that of the California statute
which grants public interest organizations a right to bring an
action. 62 In Massachusetts, an action may be filed by an artists'
organization or union if the artist has consented in writing to the
organization bringing the claim. 63 Additionally, if the artist is
deceased, the state attorney general may bring an action for
injunctive relief on the artist's behalf, so long as the work of art is
in the public view."a For actions brought by the artist or the
artist's heir or representative, it is not required that the work be in
public view. 65

II. TUB VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990

A. The History of CongressionalEfforts to ProtectArtists' Moral
Rights
Pursuant to Congress' constitutional mandate "to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts,"' members of Congress
have introduced various bills designed to protect the moral rights

160. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 85S(b) (West Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-2(B)
(1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2102 (Purdon Supp. 1991).
161. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116s(2) (West Supp. 1991).
162. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. § 85S(e), (g) (West Supp. 1991).
163. L § 85S(e) (West Supp. 1991).
164. IL § 85S(g) (West Supp. 1991).
165. a § 85S(c) (West Supp. 1991).
166. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. See 135 CoNo. REc. S6813, S6813 (daily ed. June 16, 1989)
(statement of Sen. Kasten) (congressional regulation of moral rights is authorized by the copyright
clause).
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of artists since as early as 1940."67 Recently, there have been
renewed congressional efforts to protect moral rights. One bill was
introduced and subsequently rejected in 1977, two years before the
enactment of the California moral rights statute.'68 The rejected
bill proposed protections similar to those ultimately created by the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.'6 9 Over the next ten years,
several other bills were introduced and rejected in Congress, all
170
seeking to protect artists' moral rights.
The genesis of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 is most
likely found in two identical unenacted House and Senate bills
introduced by Representative Markey and Senator Kennedy,
proposing the "Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987.'' 171 These
bills, like the California statute, defined a "work of fine art" as a
"pictorial, graphic or sculptural work of recognized stature," and
included a provision allowing the trier of fact to consult art experts
to determine whether the work is of recognized stature.1 2 The
bills proposed a system of protections for moral rights which, like
the New York statute, was based on protecting the author's

167. See S. 3043, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 5 (1940). This unenacted bill, an amendment to the
federal copyright laws, stated that nothing in the copyright laws should impair an artist's right "to
claim the paternity of his work as well as the right to object to every deformation, mutilation, or
other modification of the said work which may be prejudicial to his honor or to his reputation." IcL
168. See H.R. 8261, 95th Cong, Ist Sess. (1977).
169. Id The bill provided, in relevant part:
Independently of the author's copyright in a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, the
author or the author' legal representative shall have the right, during the life of the author
and fifty years after the author's death, to claim authorship of such work and to object to
any distortion, mutilation, or other alteration thereof, and to enforce any other limitation
recorded in the Copyright Office that would prevent prejudice to the author's honor or
reputation.
Id § 2. The proposed act was entitled the "Visual Artists Moral Rights Amendment of 1977." Id
§ 1.
170. See, e.g., H.R. 288,96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNa. REc. 164 (1979); H.R. 2908,97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CoNG. REc. H5691 (1981); H.R. 1521,98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CoNe. REC.
2414 (1983); H.R. 5772,99th Cong., 2d Seass., 132 CONG. REc. 32,704 (1986); S. 2796, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess., 132 CONG. Rnc. S 12,185 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986); S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133
CONG. REc. SI1,502 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1987); H.R. 3221, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNe. REc.
E3425 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987).
171. See S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S11,502 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1987);
H.R. 3221, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. E3425 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987).
172. See S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 133 CoNa. REc. SII,502 (daily ed. Aug. 6,
1987); H.R. 3221, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. E3425 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987).
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reputation.1 73 These protections applied only to works which were
publicly displayed.' 74 Additionally, the 1987 bill included a droit
de suite, or right of the artist to participate in profits realized by
subsequent purchasers when the purchasers resell the work, for any
sale of a work for over $1,000.175 This provision is analogous to
a current California statute. 76 The bills proposing the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1987 failed to gain passage by Congress. The
sponsor of the 1987 bill believed that the inclusion of the resale
royalties provisions was a major motivating factor in Congress'
failure to approve the legislation. 1"
In 1988, The United States joined the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. 178 Congress had
debated whether the United States should join the Convention for
nearly one hundred years. 179 It is believed that Congress was
slow to support the United States' inclusion in the Berne
Convention because of Article 6bis of the Convention, which many
members of Congress believe would require enactment of a system
to provide protection for artists' moral rights.' 80 Article 6bis
guarantees to artists the rights of paternity and integrity.'

173. See S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1stSess. § 2, 133 CONo. REc. S11,502 (daily ed. Aug. 6,
1987); H.R. 3221, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. E3425 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987).
174. See S. 1619, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2, 133 CoNG. REc. S11,502 (daily ed. Aug. 6,
1987); H.R. 3221, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNG. REc. E3425 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987).
175. See S. 1619, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2, 133 CONG. REc. S11,502 (daily ed. Aug. 6,
1987); H.R. 3221, 100th Cong., Ist Seas., 133 CONG. REC. E3425 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987).
176. Compare S. 1619 and H.R. 3221 with CAL. Civ. CODE § 986 (West Supp. 1991)
(providing for resale royalties). See generally Menerney, CaliforniaResale Royalties Act: Private
Sector Enforcement, 19 U.S.F. L REV. 1 (1984) (discussing Civil Code section 986).
177. 136 CoNG. REc. H3115 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Markey).
178. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988).
179. H.R. REP. NO. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6915, 6917 (1990).

180. H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-40 (1988).
181. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, reprinted
in 4 NIMMER, NIMaR ON COPYRiGHT 27-1 app. at 27-5 (1987). The full text of article 6bis states:
(1) Independently of the authors economic rights, and even after the transfer of said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to,
the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph
shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights, and
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However, Congress ultimately determined that the Berne
Convention did not require adoption of federal moral rights
legislation because the terms of the convention in this regard were
already satisfied by existing federal and state statutory and common
laws.182 Congress also decided that this determination would not
foreclose future efforts to enact a federal system of moral rights
protection.183 Thus, while members of Congress may have
believed that moral rights legislation was not required by the Berne
Convention, congressional proponents of moral rights stressed that
such legislation would help ensure continued compliance with the
Berne Convention. 4
Against this backdrop, on June 20, 1989, Representative Robert
Kastenmeier and Representative Edward Markey introduced H.R.
2690, entitled the "Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989.1"' This
bill was ultimately enacted as the Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990.1"6 On June 16, 1989, Senator Kennedy introduced a nearly

identical bill in the Senate. 87 On October 27, 1990, the Senate
passed H.R. 2690, after incorporating the bill into a bill containing
several other provisions relating to federal courts.' 88 The House
passed the bill on the same day.' 89 President Bush signed the

shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the
country where protection is claimed. However, those countries whose legislation, at the
moment of their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection
after the death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding may provide that
some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be
governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
Id
182. H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-40 (1988).
183. Id
184. See 136 CONG. Rnc. H3113, H3113 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier) (the protections included in the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 are "based on those
set forth in the Berne Convention"). See also 136 CONe. Rzc. H8271 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Markey) (implying that federal protection of moral rights is required by the Berne
Convention).
185. H.R. 2690, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CoNG. REc. E2199 (daily ed. June 20, 1989).
186. Pub. L No. 101-650, §§ 601-610, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128-33 (1990).
187. See S. 1198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S6811 (daily ed. June 16, 1989).
188. See REPORT ON TiE AcTIvmEs oF THm COMMITE oN THE JUDIcIARY, H. REP. No.
1015, 101st Cong., 2d Seas. 70 (1991).
189. Id
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legislation enacting the "Judicial Improvement Act of 1990," Title
VII of which was the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, on
December 1, 1990.'90 The effective date of the bill was six
months after passage, on June 1, 1991.191
B. The Provisions of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
1. Substantive Provisions
The Visual Artists Rights Act 192 (hereinafter "1990 Act")
establishes a system of moral rights protections which, in several
respects, is distinguishable from the New York and California
statutes. The following discussion sets forth the substantive
protections of the 1990 Act.
a. ProtectedSubject Matter
The protections of the 1990 Act apply only to those items that
qualify as a "work of visual art."'1 9 The legislative history of
the 1990 Act indicates that Congress intended to draft a very
narrow definition of that term.1 94 The apparent congressional
intent was to avoid overly constricting the business practices of
industries that are heavily dependent upon copyright protection and
copyrighted works.195
The term "work of visual art" encompasses original paintings,
drawings, or sculptures.'96 To qualify as a work of visual art, the
item must exist only in a single copy or in a limited edition of two

190. Id See Pub. L. No. 101-650,104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (Judicial Improvements Act of 1990);
iU title VI, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990).
191. Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 610, 104 Stat. 5089, 5132-33 (1990).
192. Pub. L No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5129 (1990) (hereinafter 1990 Act).
193. Id § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)).
194. See, e.g., 136 CoNG. REc. E3716, E3716-17 (daily ed. Nov. 2,1990) (statement of Rep.
Moorhead) (stressing the narrowly-drawn nature of the category or protected works); 136 CONG. REC.
H8266, H8271 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Markey) (stating that the definition was
intentionally narrow).
195. 136 CONG. REc. E3716, E3716-17 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
196. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 602 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 101).
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hundred or fewer copies.' Qualified works which exist in a
single copy need not be signed by the artist, but such works which
exist in multiple copies must be signed and consecutively
numbered by the artist.19 The term "work of visual art" also
encompasses still photographs produced for the purpose of
exhibition, so long as the photograph exists in a single signed copy,
or in a signed, consecutively numbered limited edition of no more
than two hundred units." While the author must create the
photograph for the purpose of exhibition, the House Judiciary
Committee made clear its view that the original purpose for which
the photograph was produced is controlling, and therefore "a
qualifying photograph will not fall outside the ambit of the bill's
protection simply because it is later used for nonexhibition
purposes."' However, if such photographs are reproduced for
use in a different medium such as a newspaper or magazine, only
the original photograph (or its limited edition20copies) and not the
reproduction is protected under the 1990 Act. '
The 1990 Act specifies certain categories of items that do not
qualify as works of visual art.2" This group partially includes
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, books and periodicals,
maps and charts, and merchandising, advertising, and promotional
materials." 3 Additionally, only works that are subject to

197.

Id. Copies of sculptures may be "in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated." IM.

198. Ma.
In the case of sculptures, the copies must "bear the signature or other identifying mark
of the author." IdAccording to the House Committee on the Judiciary, the physical location of the
signature and number on the work is unimportant. H.RL REP. No. 514, 101st Cong,, 2d Sess. 13,
reprintedin 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEws 6915, 6923. The committee stated that courts
should be flexible in determining whether placement of the signature and number are sufficient, and
that placement on the back of the work or on the surrounding matting would be adequate. Id.
199. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 602 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 101).
200. H.RL REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Seass. 12, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6915, 6922.
201. Id See 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3)) (exception of
reproductions from coverage).
202. Id § 602 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 101).

203. Id Specifically, the 1990 Act provides:
A work of visual art does not include(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art,
motion picture or other audio-visual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data
base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar publication;
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copyright protection under federal law are included in the definition

of "work of visual art."'
Significantly, a work that qualifies as a "work made for hire"
is not protected by the 1990 Act.205 Existing federal copyright
statutes define a "work made for hire" as a work prepared by an
employee in the scope of employment, or a work specially

commissioned in writing for inclusion in a larger collective
work.20
Prior to a recent Supreme Court decision, the federal courts had
reached conflicting results in determining whether a commissioned
work prepared by an independent contractor constituted a work
prepared by an "employee," therefore qualifying as a "work made
for hire" for copyright purposes. Some cases were decided on the
whenever the
theory that the artist is an "employee"
commissioning party retains a right to control the work. °7 Some
circuits held that the artist is an "employee" whenever the
commissioning party actually exercised control over the creation of
the work.20 ' In Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children &
Adults of Louisiana v. Playboy Enterprises,2°9 the Fifth Circuit

(ii) any merchandising item or advertising promotional, descriptive, covering, or
packaging material or container ....
ICE
204. l
205. Id.
206. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Specifically, the statute provides, in relevant part:
A "work made for hire" is(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation,
as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as an answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
Id A "collective work" is defined as "a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or
encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in
themselves, are assembled into a collective whole." Id
207. See, e.g., Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D. Colo. 1985); Clarkstown
v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 141 (S.D. N.Y. 1983).
208. See, e.g., Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopehas Pub. Co., 810 F.2d 410,413 (4th
Cir. 1987); Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert denied, 479 U.S. 949, (1986); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.
1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
209.815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
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reasoned that the distinction between employees and nonemployees
should be determined in accordance with traditional common law
agency principles for distinguishing between employees and
independent contractors.2 1 In Dumas v. Gommerman,2 1 1 the
Ninth Circuit held that the term "employee" referred only to
traditional salaried employees.212 The Supreme Court of the
United States resolved this controversy in 1989, in a unanimous
decision in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid.213
In Community for Creative Non-Violence, an organization
committed to eradicating homelessness, the Community for
Creative Non-Violence (hereinafter CCNV) orally agreed with a
sculptor to commission a life-size sculpture depicting the plight of
the homeless in the United States. 214 The sculpture, entitled
"Third World America," was to be erected in a public place
during the Christmas season, and was to depict a modem day
nativity scene consisting of two adult figures and one child
figure. 215 The figures were to be depicted as contemporary
homeless people huddled over a steam grate with a placard bearing
the legend "and still there is no room at the inn. '' 2 6 The CCNV
proposed the theme of the sculpture and chose the exact
configuration of the figures from several sketches made by the
sculptor.2

7

Upon completion, both the sculptor and CCNV each claimed
ownership of the copyright of the sculpture. 21 8 To determine
ownership under applicable copyright law, the Court was required
to determine whether the work was "made for hire, ' 219 within

210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 335.
865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1102.
490 U.S. 730 (1989).

214. 14 at 734.
215. I& at 733.
216. 1d
217. Id. at 734.
218. Id. at 735.
219. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (defmition of work made for hire).
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the definition of the copyright statute.' The Court reasoned that
the term "employee" in the definition of "work made for hire"
should be understood in light of the ordinary common law agency
definitions of the terms "employee"
and "independent
contractor."" 2 The Court stated that while a hiring party's right
to control an artist's work is highly relevant in determining whether
the artist was an employee or an independent contractor,' other
factors must be considered, including the skill required, the
ownership of instrumentalities or tools used in the production of
the work, the location of the work, the duration of the working
relationship, the right of the artist to set his or her own working
hours, and the provision of employee benefits.223 Applying these
factors to the facts of the case, the Court determined that although
the CCNV exercised some control over the creation of the
sculpture, consideration of the other factors required the Court to
hold that Reid was an independent contractor rather than an
employee, and the work was therefore not made for hire. 4
In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Community for
Creative Non-Violence, it seems likely that many commissioned
works will be protected by the 1990 Act. Only those works created
by an actual employee of the commissioning party, or those works
contractually commissioned for inclusion in a collective work will
be excluded from protection as "works made for hire."
b. Scope of the Artist's Rights
The 1990 Act contains certain protections analogous to the
French droitmoral. However, these rights are expressly limited by

220. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 750. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988)
(copyright ownership of works made for hire is vested in the person for whom the work was
prepared). An extended discussion of copyright law is beyond the scope of this Article.
221. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 740-41.
222. 1& at 750-51.
223. 1&. at 751-52 (citing RESTATEiENT (SECOND) OF AMENCy § 220).
224. Id. at 752-53. The court pointed out that Reid, as a sculptor, engaged in a skilled
occupation. I&. at 752. The court also noted that Reid supplied his own tools, worked without
supervision out of his studio, worked for a period of less than two months, and was compensated by
a flat fee rather than an hourly salary. let at 752-53.
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the fair use doctrine, which permits persons other than the
copyright owner to use copyrighted material in a reasonable
manner without the owner's consent.' Additionally, all rights
are separate and independent from any copyright interest the artist
may have in the work 6 The rights created by the 1990 Act
belong only to the artist who created the work.227 In the case of
coauthors, all authors are the co-owners of the rights.228
i.

Rights of Paternity and Disavowal

The 1990 Act contains a right of paternity.2 The 1990 Act
provides that independent of any copyright rights, the artist has a
right to claim authorship of any work of visual art he or she
creates.23 0 Additionally, the artist has the right to prevent the use
of his or her name in connection with a work that he or she did not
create.'
The 1990 Act grants the artist a right of disavowal. The artist
has the right to disclaim authorship of a work that has been
distorted, mutilated, or modified.232 The artist may only disclaim
authorship under this provision if use of the artist's name in
connection with the work would be prejudicial to the artist's honor
or reputation. 3
Whereas the New York and California statutes grant the artist
234
the right to disclaim authorship "for and just a valid reason,'
the federal statute contains no such provision. Consequently, it is

225. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)). See 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1988) (fair use provisions).
226. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)). See 17 U.S.C. § 106
(1988) (availability of copyright protection).
227. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b)).
228. 1,4
229. See . (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)) (right of paternity).
230. Id. (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A)).
231. 1&4(enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(B)).
232. Id. (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2)).
233. Id234. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (discussing the California statutory right
of disavowal); supra notes 115-122 and accompanying text (discussing the New York statutory right
of disavowal).
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unclear from the text of the 1990 Act whether the artist may
disclaim authorship because of the use of the art without the artist's
consent in, for example, an advertising campaign which the artist
finds distasteful. While under the New York and California
statutes, this scenario would likely be viewed as a just and valid
reason to disclaim authorship which adversely affects the artist's
reputation, 2 5 under the federal statutes it is doubtful whether a
court would view this as a "distortion" or "modification" within
the meaning of the 1990 Act.
The 1990 Act contains a provision stating that a modification
resulting from "the public presentation, including the lighting and
placement" of a work is not a "modification" for purposes of the
right of integrity. 236 While' the literal language of the statute
states that this provision applies only to actions seeking to protect
the artist's right of integrity,2" it is unlikely that courts would
interpret the right of disavowal to require apparently inconsistent
results. In other words, judicial interpretation of the term
"modification" as used in the right of disavowal provisions to
include undesirable presentations of the work would mean that an
author could prevent the use of his or her name in connection with
such a display, but could not prevent the display. The legislative
history of the 1990 Act implies that the term "modification"
should have the same meaning for both the right of disavowal and
the right of integrity,238 although there is little if any expression

235.

Cf. Serra v. U.S. Gen. Services Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1052 (2d Cir. 1988) (although

holding that federal government's act or moving artist's "'site specific" sculpture was not a violation
of artist's due process rights, court acknowledged that the artist "might suffer injury to his reputation
as a result of relocation of the sculpture").
236. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2)). This provision is
discussed in more detail below. See infra notes 253-257 and accompanying text.
237. ,d. See infra notes 239-273 and accompanying text (discussing the right of integrity under
the 1990 Act).
238. See H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONO.
& ADMIN. NEWs 6915, 6924 (stating that "the author shall have the right to prevent the use of his
or her name in connection with a work of visual art that has been modified in a way that would
violate the right of integrity set forth in" the provision of the 1990 Act creating a right of integrity).
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of this view in the text of the statute."' It is unlikely that a court
would interpret the 1990 Act in a manner inconsistent with this
legislative history.
ii. Right of Integrity
The 1990 Act provides for an artist's right of integrity. 2 0 The
1990 Act prohibits the intentional distortion, mutilation, or
modification of a work of visual art.241 To be actionable, the
distortion, mutilation, or modification must be prejudicial to the
artist's honor or reputation.242 The legislative history indicates
that Congress intended the statute to encompass only acts which
adversely affected the artist's artisticorprofessionalreputation, not
the artist's personal reputation. 243
The right of integrity in the 1990 Act was subject to several
amendments and revisions in the legislative process. As introduced,
the bill contained no state of mind provision, and could reasonably
have been interpreted as imposing strict liability. 244 An
amendment to the bill made only intentional or negligent acts

239. See 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)) (exceptions to
coverage). Both the exception for modifications resulting from the passage of time and the exception
for modifications resulting from placement state that such a modification is not a "distortion,
mutilation, or other modification described in subsection (a)(3)." Id. (enacting 17 U.S.C. §
106A(c)(1)-(2)). Subsection (a)(3) is the right of integrity provision. See i4 (enacting 17 U.S.C. §
106A(a)(3)). As previously stated, the House Committee on the Judiciary Report stated that the term
"modification'" had the same meaning for both the right of integrity and the right of vithdrawal. See
supra note 203 (quoting the Judiciary Committee report). The apparent inconsistency between the
House Report and the plain language of the statute may be attributable to faulty draftsmanship.
240. See 1990 Act, supranote 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)) (right of integrity).
241. Id. (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A)).
242. Id The legislative history indicates that Congress believed that "'t]he formulation for
determining whether harm to honor or reputation exists must of necessity be flexible. The trier of fact
must examine the way in which a work has been modified and professional reputation of the author
of the work." H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONO.
& ADMIN. NEws 6915, 6925-26 (citation omitted). Expert testimony as to whether the modification
affects the artist's honor or reputation is appropriate. Id)
243. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONO. &
ADMIN. NEws 6915, 6925.
244. See H.R. 2690, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 135 CONG. REc. E2199, E2200 (daily ed. June
20, 1989) (bill as introduced).
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actionable.24 5 The House Committee on the Judiciary viewed this
amendment as a "clarification," rather than an alteration, of the
bill as introduced.246 As enacted, the 1990 Act prohibits only
intentional acts of distortion, mutilation, or modification.247 Given
this history of congressional narrowing of the state of mind
requirement, it is likely that courts will strictly construe the
requirement that the act of distortion or modification be intentional.
As introduced, the bill contained language stating that the
distortion or alteration of a "work of recognized stature"
constituted a virtual per se showing of harm to the artist's
reputation, and was therefore actionable. 8 The bill contained
provisions similar to the California statute, specifying procedures
by which expert testimony could establish the recognized stature of
the work. 249 The House Committee on the Judiciary believed that
such a provision would have the undesirable potential of
encouraging increased litigation by instigating battles of experts
over whether works had attained the requisite recognized
stature." 0 The provision does not appear in the 1990 Act as
enacted, at least in regard to the distortion, mutilation, or
modification of works of visual art.251
Changes in a work resulting from the passage of time or as a
result of the inherent nature of the materials used in the work do
not constitute actionable acts of distortion, mutilation, or
modification."12 Additionally, modifications resulting from
conservation of the work or from public presentation, including

245. See H.R. 2690,101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3, 136 CoNG. REc. H311 1, H3112 (daily ed. June
5, 1990) (bill as amended).
246. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AwtmI. NEws 6915, 6926.
247. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A)).
248. See H.R. 2690, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. § 3, 135 CONG. REc. E2199, E2200 (daily ed. June
20, 1989) (bill as introduced).
249. Id.
250. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 6915, 6925.
251. However, the Judiciary Committee recognized that modification of a work of recognized
stature will ordinarily cause harm to the author's reputation. Il at 16, reprintedin 1990 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMiN NEws at 6926.
252. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1)).
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lighting and placement, generally do not constitute an actionable
distortion, mutilation, or modification of the work. 253 However,
in an apparent exception to the requirement that such acts be
intentional in order to be actionable, modifications caused by
conservation or public presentation are actionable if they are the
result of gross negligence. 2s4
(Congress recognized that the term "public presentation" could
be interpreted to shield some actionable acts. In a published report,
the House Judiciary Committee stated that "galleries and museums
continue to have normal discretion to light, frame, and place works
of art. However, conduct that goes beyond presentation of a work
of art to physical modification of it is actionable. ' ' 255 The
Committee cited the example of two Australian entrepreneurs who
cut an original Picasso into five hundred pieces, selling them at
$135 each as "original Picasso pieces,"" 6 and stated that such
acts would not qualify as acts of "public presentation."'" On the
other hand, the Committee cited a Canadian case 258 in which an
artist objected to a shopping center's act of decorating a sculpture
of geese in flight with Christmas decorations during the holiday
season, and stated that such a case would fall into the exception for
public presentation."
In addition to prohibiting distortion, mutilation, or modification
of works of visual art, the 1990 Act prohibits the destruction of
such works. 2 ' Destruction of a work need not be intentional to
be actionable; destruction caused by grossly negligent conduct is
actionable as well.26' As with the provision preventing distortion,

253. Id. (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2)).
254. Id
255. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONO. &
ADMIN. NEws 6915, 6927.
256. See 136 CONG. REc. H8266, H8271 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990) (discussing the facts of the
destruction of the Picasso painting).
257. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 6915, 6927.
258. Snow v. The Eaton Centre, Ltd., 70 Can. Pat. Rptr. 2d 105 (Ont. High Ct. 1982).
259. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMN. NEws 6915, 6927.
260. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B)).
261. Id.
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mutilation, or modification, any destruction of the work as a result
of conservation or public presentation of the work is not actionable
unless caused by gross negligence. 262 However, the provision
prohibiting destruction has different requirements than the provision
prohibiting modifications or alterations: Although there is no
requirement to prove that the destruction is injurious to the artist's
honor or reputation, the destruction of the work is only actionable
if the work is of recognized stature.263
The presence of the "of recognized stature" standard in the
1990 Act is curious in light of Congress' explicit rejection of a
similar standard in the provision prohibiting modifications, and in
light of Congress' apparent view that such a standard would invite
unnecessary controversy concerning the recognized status of the
work in question. 2 At the time Congress deleted the standard
from the modification provision, it also deleted the standard from
the destruction provision.2 That version of the bill also provided
that to be actionable, a destruction of a work must adversely affect
the artist's honor or reputation.26 The version of the bill as
approved created the separate requirements for the destruction of
works of art which mandate that the work be of recognized stature,
and which make an inquiry into the effect of the destruction of the
work on the artist's reputation irrelevant.2 67 The motivation for
Congress' decision to once again amend the destruction provision
to include the "of recognized stature" language and remove the
requirement of injury to the artist's reputation may be implied by
the justification cited by the House Judiciary Committee for the
removal of the standard from the provision prohibiting
modification:

262. kId (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2)).
263. Id.(enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(A)(3)(B)).
264. See supra notes 252-249 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' rejection of the "of
recognized stature" standard as applied to modification of works).
265. See H.R. 2690, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3, 136 CoNo. REC. H3111, H3112 (daily ed. June
5, 1990) (as amended).
266. Id.
267. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B)). The provision

simply states that the artist has the right "to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature,
and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.- Id
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[B]y deleting the language, the bill makes clear that to be protected, an
author need not prove a pre-existing standing in the artistic community.
The Committee appreciates that less well-known or appreciated artists
also have honor and reputations worthy of protection. The deletion of
this language is consistent with the fact that, throughout history, many
works now universally acknowledged as masterpieces have been
rejected and often misunderstood by the general public at the time they
were created.2' 8

The Committee felt that this standard was in line with the interest
protected by article 6bis of the Berne Convention: The artist's
interest in maintaining his or her honor and reputation. 2 9 Article
6bis of the Berne Convention does not contain language concerning
the destruction of works of art, but is concerned only with the
"distortion, mutilation, or other modification" of the work."'
Although the Berne Convention does not impose a right of
enforcement for destruction of works of art, the Committee
observed that "it is clear that the Convention simply sets a floor
for protection and does not prohibit member countries from
'
providing additional rights."271
The Committee believed that
prevention of the destruction of art was beneficial to society, and
was best accomplished by giving the artist enforcement rights. 2
It appears, therefore, that Congress believed that prohibiting
destruction of works of art serves national interests. It is similarly
apparent that Congress was of the view that the destruction of
works of art does not have the same adverse impact on the artist's
reputation as alteration or modification of the work. Despite
congressional recognition of the fact that "many works now
universally acknowledged as masterpieces have been rejected and
often misunderstood by the general public at the time they were
created," Congress likely believed that protection from destruction
268. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONo. &
ADmIN. NEws 6915, 6925.
269. Id See supra note 182 (quoting the text of article 6bis of the Berne Convention, focusing
on protection of the artist's honor and reputation).
270. See supra note 182 (text of article 6bis).
271. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d $ess. 16, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONO. &
ADMIN. NEws 6915, 6926.
272. Id
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of works that are not "of recognized stature" may not be worth
the amount of litigation such a broad right would create.273
The wording of the 1990 Act creates an interesting
interpretational possibility. Under the California statute, only an
alteration or destruction by someone other than the artist is
actionable.274 The 1990 Act contains no express exclusion from
liability for the artist who creates the work. In the case of
coauthors, all authors are the coowners of the right of enforcement
for violation of the 1990 Act.275 It therefore appears that one
coauthor could bring an action against another coauthor for
modification or destruction of the work. Should such a case ever
arise, it will be interesting to see if the courts will interpret the
1990 Act literally, so as to impose liability upon a creator of a
work of visual art for the modification or destruction of the work
by a coauthor.
iii. Exception for Reproductions
Under the 1990 Act, the rights of paternity and disavowal do
not apply to "any reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use
of a work" in connection with books, newspapers, periodicals,
motion pictures and audiovisual works, and other media that are
specifically excluded from the definition of a "work of visual
While the text of this provision seems ambiguous,
art.
examination of the legislative history helps to clear away some of
the murkiness surrounding the provision.

273. But see i. at 10, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at 6920 (statement of Hon.
John E. Frohnmayer, Chairman, National Endowment for the Arts) (acknowledging that "11 State
statutes have operated successfully and that they 'have not engendered a blizzard of litigation"').
274. CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(c)(1) (West Supp. 1991). The California statute reads:
No person, except an artist who owns andpossesses a work of fine art which the artist

has created, shall intentionally commit, or authorize the intentional commission of, any
physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a work of fine art.
Md.(emphasis added).
275. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b)).
276.
L (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3)). See it& § 602 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 101)
(definition of "work of visual art").
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An original version of a work of art is certainly protected by
the 1990 Act, but reproductions are not so protected.2 7 7 The
legislative history of this provision indicates that Congress believed
that it was necessary to ensure that copyright holders would be
insulated from liability for traditional, everyday uses of their
copyrighted material.273 The provision is designed, for example,
to allow the producer of a motion picture to film a scene in an art
gallery without specifying the authorship of all of the works
depicted in the gallery, or to allow newspapers or magazines to
freely publish photographs of artwork without including the artist's
name in the caption of the photoY 9
Similarly, the statute provides that such a reproduction,
depiction, portrayal, or other use may not be viewed as a violation
280
of the right of integrity.
iv. Special Rulesfor Works IncorporatedInto Buildings
Like the California statutes, the 1990 Act provides for special
treatment for works of visual art incorporated into buildings. The
report of the House Committee on the Judiciary states that these
provisions were largely patterned after those of the California
statute.28
The 1990 Act provides that the right of integrity does not apply
when the owner of a building wishes to remove a work of art that
has been affixed to the building in such a manner that removal will
cause damage to or destruction of the work of art, so long as the
artist had consented to the installation of the work in the

277. H.RL REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONo. &
ADMiN. NEws 6915, 6927.
273. Id.; 136 CONG. REC. E3716, E3717 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Moorhead). But see 136 CoNe. REc. E1939 (daily ed. June 13, 1990) (statement of Rep. Williams)
(expressing disappointment that reproductions were excluded from protection).
279. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 6915, 6927.
280. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3)).
281. H.RL REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6915, 6929.
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building.8 2 In the case of works of art installed in buildings prior
to June 1, 1991, the artist's consent may be written or oral.28 3 In
the case of works installed on or after June 1, 1991, the consent
must be in a written instrument signed by the author, which
specifies that removal of the work could cause damage to or
destruction of the work of art. 2
If the work of art could be removed from the building without
causing mutilation or destruction of the work, the owner of the
building is liable for any damage or destruction caused by the
removal unless the owner makes a diligent, good faith effort to
notify the artist, or unless the owner actually notifies the artist and
the artist fails to remove the work or pay for its removal within
ninety days of receiving notice.285
c. Duration, Transfer, and Waiver of the Rights
For works created on or after June 1, 1991, the rights created
by the 1990 Act expire upon the death of the artist.2" 6 For works

created prior to June 1, 1991, to which the artist still holds title, the
rights are coextensive with the copyright protection of the work,
which is fifty years beyond the artist's death. 287 All terms of the
rights run until the end of the calendar year in which they would
otherwise expire. 88
Noticeably absent from the provisions specifying the duration
of the rights is any provision describing the duration of rights with
282. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 604 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)).
283. Ad4(amending 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(B)). Since the language of the statute does not
explicitly specify what form the consent must take, it is possible the provision could be interpreted
as providing that implied consent is sufficient.
284. I,4
285. M,4(amending 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2)(A)-(B)). An owner is presumed to have made a good
faith, diligent effort to notify the artist if he or she sends the artist notification via registered mail at
the artist's most recent address on file with the Register of Copyrights. Id. The 1990 Act requires the
Register of Copyrights to establish a system of records for filing information concerning works of
visual art that have been incorporated into buildings. Md.(amending 17 U.S.C. § 113(3)).
286. Id § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1)). In the case of joint works, the rights expire
upon the death of the last surviving author. Id (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(3)).
287. Id (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(2)). See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988) (specifying the
duration of copyright protection).
288. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(4)).
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respect to works of art created before June 1, 1991, to which the
artist does not still hold title. This oversight may be the product of
faulty draftsmanship.289 Subsection (d)(3) states, in its entirety:
"In the case of a joint work prepared by two or more authors, the
rights conferred by subsection (a) [the rights of paternity and
integrity provisions] shall endure for a term consisting of the life
of the last surviving author." 290 On its face, this provision seems
to apply to all joint works, regardless of time of creation, and
regardless of ownership of title. Therefore, it would be inconsistent
if Congress had intended to give protection to joint works created
before the passage of the 1990 Act to which the authors no longer
had title, but to deny protection to similar works created by an
individual author. Additionally, the provision that all rights are to
expire at the end of the calendar year in which they would
otherwise expire seems nonsensical in the case of rights which
expire upon the death of the artist. Since the artist is the only
person who is empowered by the statute to enforce the right, it is
unlikely that the artist will gain much advantage from the added
time to enforce the rights between the time of his or her death and
the end of the calendar year!291
The confusion in the provisions regarding duration of the rights
may be attributable to the fact that these provisions of the bill were
apparently amended at the last minute. As introduced, the bill
provided that with respect to works created on or after the effective
date of the Act, the rights would expire fifty years after the artist's
death, while for works that were created but not published prior to
the effective date, the rights would be coextensive with the

289. As one of the cosponsors of the bill stated, "[A]rtworks are intellectual expression, not
just physical property ....This bill recognizes that title to the soul of an art work does not pass with
the sale of the art work itself." 136 CoNG. REc. H8266, H8271 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990) (statement
of Rep. Markey).
290. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(3)).

291.

It seems unlikely that this provision is designed to create a right of enforcement for the

personal representative of the artist's estate to seek redress for acts occurring after the artist's death.
First, it would seem that such a congressional intent would be explicitly spelled out in the statute.
Second, given the personal nature of the rights and the focus on protecting the artist's professional
reputation, postmortem enforcement would seem inconsistent with the statutory scheme.
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copyright protection.2" The bill was later amended to provide
that for works created prior to the effective date and for which the
artist still owned the copyright, the artist or the persons to whom
the artist's copyright passed through bequest or intestate succession
could enforce the rights under the Act until the expiration of the
copyright.293 In the final version, of course, the postmortem rights
were deleted and the rights relating to works created before the
effective date of the 1990 Act are determined by whether the artist
still possesses title to the art.294 The frequent and varying
amendments to the provisions, some of which were imposed at the
eleventh hour, may have caused Congress to inadvertently leave out
a necessary provision. The 1990 Act, in its current state, provides
that works which were created prior to June 1, 1990 to which the
artist no longer holds title are not given protection. However,
although this term seems inconsistent with the remainder of the
statute, the courts will likely interpret the statute in this literal
manner until Congress legislatively clarifies the provision.
In addition to the above provisions concerning the durations of
rights, actions brought under the 1990 Act are subject to the statute
of limitations generally applicable to civil actions brought under the
federal copyright provisions. The statute of limitations for all such
actions is three years after the accrual of the cause of action.29
The artist may not transfer his or her rights under the 1990
Act.296 A transfer of the copyright in a work does not constitute
a transfer or waiver of the rights created by the 1990 Act.297
However, the artist may waive the rights created by the 1990
Act.298 The waiver must be in a written instrument signed by the
artist, and the instrument must specifically identify the work and

292.
1989).
293.
1990).
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

H.R. 2690, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 135 CONG. REc. E2199, E2200 (daily ed. June 20,
H.R. 2690, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3, 136 CONG. REc. H3111, H3112 (daily ed. June 5,
1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)).
17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1988).
1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1)).
Ic (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(2)).
let (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1)).
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the uses of the work to which the waiver applies."' In the case
of joint authors of the work, a valid waiver by one author is
enforceable against all authors of the work.3" The legislative
history of the provision indicates that Congress intended the
provision to be strictly construed against a finding of a waiver." 1
Congress intended the waiver to apply only to the specific person
32
to whom it is made, and that such waivers are nontransferable. 0
Any waiver of the rights created under the 1990 Act does not
constitute a waiver of the artist's copyright rights or a transfer of
3 3
the artist's ownership interest in the work.
d Available Remedies
The 1990 Act specifically excludes the imposition of criminal
sanctions for violation of any of its provisions.3°4 Aside from
criminal penalties, the artist may choose from the full range of civil
remedies generally available under federal copyright law.30 5
Possible remedies include injunctive relief,3' 6 actual money
damages or profits,3" or statutory damages. 0 8 In actions to
enforce the rights and obligations arising under the 1990 Act, the
court may award costs and attorneys' fees to the prevailing
39
party. 0

299. Id
3C0. Id
301. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmIN. NEwS 6915, 6928.
302. Id. at 18-19, reprintedin 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at 6928-29.
303. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(2)).
304. Id § 606(b) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 506(0).
305. Id § 606(a) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 501(a)).
306. See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1988) (provision governing injunctive relief).
307. See id § 504(b) (1988) (provision governing awards of money damages and profits).
308. See id § 504(c) (1988) (providing for, in the absence of a showing of actual damages,
discretionary awards of statutory damages of between $5O and $20,000).
309.
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e. Preemption of State Law
The 1990 Act contains an explicit preemption provision.3"'
The 1990 Act specifically preempts state statutory or common law
rights that are equivalent to provisions of the 1990 Act."'
However, the 1990 Act does not fully occupy the field in the area
of moral rights. The 1990 Act specifically does not preempt state
law provisions that are not the equivalent of the 1990 Act's
provisions." 2 Additionally, the preemption provision does not
affect any state law cause of action filed prior to June 1, 1991.313
The issue of preemption of specific state laws is fully discussed
below, in Part III of this Article.3 14
2. Studies by the Copyright Office
The 1990 Act requires the Register of Copyrights to conduct
two studies. First, the Register must conduct a study to determine
the extent that artists' rights under the 1990 Act are waived by
artists. 3 "' The Register of Copyrights must file a preliminary
report by December 1, 1992, and must file a final report and
supporting recommendations by December 1, 1995.316 The
purpose of the report is "to ensure that the waiver provisions serve
to facilitate current practices while not eviscerating the protections
provided" by the 1990 Act.317
Additionally, the Register of Copyrights, in conjunction with
the Chair of the National Endowment for the Arts, must conduct a
study to determine the feasibility of a system of droit de suite, or
right of resale royalties for artists. 18 The Copyright Register is

310.

1990 Act, supra note 192, § 605 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 301(t)).

311.
312.

Id (amending 17 U.S.C. § 301(0(1)).
Id (amending 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(B)).

313. Id (amending 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(A)).
314. See infra notes 320-396 and accompanying text.
315. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 608(a)(1).
316. Id. § 608(a)(2).
317. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMtN. NEws 6915, 6932.
318. Id § 608(b)(1).
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required to consult with and seek the opinions of U.S. and foreign
governments and art experts, and to submit a report to Congress by
June 1, 1992. 3' 9 As previously stated, congressional proponents
of moral rights legislation blamed the inclusion of resale royalties
provisions in earlier bills for Congress' failure to approve moral
rights legislation prior to the 1990 Act. 2 The decision by the
sponsors of the 1990 Act to propose a study of the feasibility of
resale royalties instead of proposing the creation of such rights no
doubt helped to ensure the passage of the 1990 Act.
III. THE PREEMPION OF STATE STATUTES BY THE
VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990

A. Preemption Provisionsof the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
state law must yield to conflicting federal law.321 Therefore, in an
area in which Congress may validly legislate, if Congress explicitly
provides that a state law is invalid, or if Congress implies such a
result by enacting a contradictory statute, the state law is rendered
unenforceable.
][n enacting the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Congress
explicitly provided for the preemption of certain state laws. The
1990 Act provides that, after the effective date of the act, "all legal
and equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the rights
conferred by" the 1990 Act, with respect to works of art that are
protected by the 1990 Act, "shall be governed exclusively" by the
1990 Act.322 Thus, the 1990 Act explicitly preempts equivalent
3 23
rights arising under either state statutes or state common law.
IEven if Congress had not enacted the preemption provision, it
is possible that all similar state causes of action could have been

319.
320.
legislation
321.
322.
323.
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Id. § 608(b)(2)-(3).
See supra notes 176-178 and accompanying text (discussing failed efforts to pass
in Congress granting resale royalty rights to artists).
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
1990 Act, supra note 192, § 605 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(1)).
Id.

1992 / The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
barred. Courts may have interpreted the 1990 Act and analogous
federal copyright statutes as having "occupied the field," by
enacting a scheme of rights so broad as to imply Congress' intent
to exclusively control this area of the law. 24 In such a case,
federal statutes preempt all state statutes in an area, even if the
state statutes are not equivalent to the federal statutes, do not
conflict with the federal statutes, and would agree with and
promote the federal policies."z Therefore, had Congress remained
silent on the issue, it is possible that all state moral rights laws
would be viewed as preempted even if they were not equivalent to
the 1990 Act, since the 1990 Act could credibly be viewed as
occupying the field.
The 1990 Act specifically provides that certain types of state
claims and laws are not preempted by the 1990 Act. First, any state
law claim filed prior to June 1, 1991 is not subject to
preemption.326 Additionally, state law claims based upon rights
extending beyond the life of the artist remain viable.327
Significantly, the 1990 Act does not preempt state laws protecting
that are not the equivalent of rights created by
the rights of artists
3 28
Act.
the 1990
Since the 1990 Act explicitly does not preempt state laws
creating rights that are not the "equivalent" of rights under the
1990 Act, the interpretation of this language is highly significant.
The language of the preemption provision, 329 as well as its

324. See L.TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITUTIONAL LAW 497 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the various
ways in which Congress may occupy the field).
325. lidSee, e.g., Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973) (holding that
the federal scheme for the prevention of aircraft noise was so broad that, even absent explicit
preemption provisions, Congress had indicated that it intended to occupy the field).
326. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 605 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(A)).
327. Id (amending 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(C)).

328. Id (amending 17 U.S.C. § 301(t(2)(B)).
329. See id (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(1)) (stating that preemption of state law is "with
respect to works of visual art to which the rights conferred by [the moral rights provisions] apply").
Presumably, this is a rather convoluted way of saying "with respect to works which are defimed as
.works of visual art' within the statute."
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legislative history,33 make it clear that state statutes affecting
works which fall outside the definition of a "work of visual
art ' 331 are not preempted by the 1990 Act. The legislative history
also states that Congress did not intend to preempt state laws

providing moral rights in areas specifically exempted from
protection by the 1990 Act, such as misattribution of authorship of
a reproduction of a work of visual art.332 Similarly, the legislative
history states that Congress did not intend to preempt state laws
granting substantive rights unrelated to the rights granted by the
1990 Act, even if those rights affect works
covered within the
' 333
art.
visual
of
"works
of
definition
federal
It is likely that certain artists who are unable to take advantage
of the federal law may still avail themselves to favorable state law.
For example, under the 1990 Act an artist who created a work and
transferred title to the work prior to June 1, 1991 apparently may
not bring an action under the 1990 Act.3 34 However, it appears
from the legislative history that such persons' claims under state
laws would not be preempted.335

330. See H.R. REP. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6915, 6931 (stating that the 1990 Act "will not preempt State causes of action relating
to works that are not covered by the law, such as audiovisual works, photographs produced for nonexhibition purposes, and works in which the copyright has been transferred before the effective
date").
331. See 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 602 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 101) (defining the term
"work of visual art"). See also supra notes 193-222 and accompanying text (discussing the federal
law definition of "work of visual art").
332. H.R. REP. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprintedin 1990 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADMIN.
NEws 6915, 6931.
333. Id For example, the legislative history shows that laws providing for artists' resale
royalties are not preempted. Id
334. See 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)) (omitting any
provision regarding the duration of rights for those artists who transfer tite to the work prior to the
effective date of the statute). See also supra notes 285-293 and accompanying text (discussing the
duration of rights under the 1990 Act).
335. H.R. REP'. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADMIN.
NEws 6915, 6931. This report states that "the new Federal law will not preempt State causes of
action relating to works that are not covered by the law, such as... works in which the copyright
has been transferred before the effective date." Id. At the time this report was written, the bill had
not yet been amended to its final form. Rather than requiring the author of works created before the
effective date of the act to possess title to the work in order to bring an action, the author was
required to possess the copyright. See H.R. 2690, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3, 136 CONG. ReC. H3111,
H3111-12 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) (text of the bill before amendment to final form). The language

1992 / The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990

On the other hand, when Congress provided that state laws
granting rights "equivalent" to the rights created by the 1990 Act,
Congress apparently intended to preempt all state statutes granting
rights of attribution, disavowal, and integrity to artists are
preempted with respect to works of visual art covered by the 1990
Act, even if the state law protections are not identical to the federal
protections. As a report by the House Committee on the Judiciary
stated:
[1f a State attempts to grant an author the rights of attribution or
integrity for works of visual art as defined in this Act, those laws will
be preempted. For example, the new law will preempt a State law
granting the right of integrity in paintings or sculpture, even if a State
law is broader than Federal law, such as by providing a right of
attribution or integrity with respect to covered
works without regard to
336
injury to the author's honor or reputation.

The apparent justification for this result is Congress' desire to enact
3 37
a uniform system of laws protecting the moral rights of artists.
One witness in the congressional hearings on the proposal to enact
the 1990 Act testified that state law protection of moral rights
constituted "a 'patchwork' of rules which by itself vitiates
somewhat the single, unified system of copyright. Artists, lawyers,
courts, and even the owners of the works deserve a single set of
rules on this subject. '

of the report seems to indicate that, similarly, an artist who would be foreclosed from pursuing an
action under federal law because he or she no longer possessed title to a work created prior to June
1, 1990 could bring an action under state law for violation of the artist's right of paternity or
integrity.
336. H.R. REP. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN.
NEws 6915, 6931.
337. See 136 CONG. REc. H3111, H3113 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier). Representative Kastenmeier, one of the cosponsors of the bill enacting the 1990 Act,
stated that one of the goals of the bill:
...was to provide a nationwide standard for these protections. H.R. 2690 will preempt
State laws in certain circumstances. While the States are free to continue to explore their
own solutions in areas not covered by this bill, a Federal law will provide the uniformity
and certainty that the individual States cannot.
l
338. H.R.R. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, reprintedin 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 6915, 6919-20 (quoting testimony of John Koegel, an art law practitioner).
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The following discussion will predict the probable preemptive
effects of the 1990 Act on the California 339 and New Yorl-4 °
moral rights statutes. Although the 1990 Act preempts common law
as well as statutory state causes of action, 341 a discussion of the
preemption of common law causes of action is beyond the scope
of this Article.2
B. Preemption of the California Statutes
Attempts to avoid total preemption of the California moral
rights statutes should be facilitated by the fact that the statutes
include an express severability provision. This provision reads:
If any provision of this section or the application thereof to any person
or circumstance is held invalid for any reason, the invalidity shall not
affect any other provisions or applications of this section which can be
application, and to this end the
effected without the invalid provision or 343
severable.
are
section
this
provisions of

Therefore, it may be possible to save portions of the statute, even
if a major portion is determined to be federally preempted. In
Raven v. Deukmeian, 4 the California Supreme Court considered
the effect of a severability provision with nearly identical language
to that of the California moral rights statute. The provision was
contained in Proposition 115, a sweeping criminal procedure reform

339. See infra notes 343-366 and accompanying text (discussing preemption of the California
statutes).
340. See infra notes 367-382 and accompanying text (discussing preemption of the New York
statute).
341. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 605 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(1)).
342. See generally Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's 'Moral Right", 16 Am.
J.CoMP. LAw 488 (1968) (discussing common law causes of action protecting moral rights). The
House Committee on the Judiciary stated that state -'causes of action such as those for
misappropriation, unfair competition, breach of contract, and deceptive trade practices... will not
be preempted" by the 1990 Act. H.R. REP. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, reprintedin 1990 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEws 6915, 6931.
343. CAL Civ. CODE § 987(k) (West Supp. 1991). See a. § 989(i) (West Supp. 1991) (similar
severability provision for statute concerning right of action by public interest organizations).
344. 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990).
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45
provision approved by the California electorate in June, 1990.1

The court determined that a portion of Proposition 115 violated the
California Constitution, and it was therefore necessary to determine
whether the provision was severable in light of the explicit
severability provision contained in the measure.3 4' The court
stated that, even if a statute includes a severability provision, the
invalid provision must be shown to be "grammatically,
functionally, and volitionally separable. '

347

With very limited

discussion, the court determined that the invalid provision was: (1)
Grammatically severable, because the provision constituted a
separate provision removable without rewording other provisions;
(2) functionally severable, because the invalid provision touched on
an area largely unrelated to the other provisions; and (3)
volitionally severable, because the voters would likely have enacted
the initiative even if they had known that the invalid provision
would be not be upheld.348
If a future defendant attempts to claim that the entire California
moral rights statute is invalid because certain preempted provisions
of the California statute are not severable from the statute, the court
will almost certainly apply the analysis established in the Raven
decision. It seems that the third element, "volitional severability,"
is perhaps the most relevant factor for courts to consider. In
considering the severability of invalid provisions of federal law, the
Supreme Court of the United States has stated that invalid
provisions are severable "[u]nless it is evident that the Legislature
would not have enacted those provisions which are within its
power, independently of that which is not."- 349 The Supreme

345. lal at 345, 801 P.2d at 1082,276 Cal. Rptr. at 331 (quoting the text of the Proposition 115
severability provision).
346. Id. at 355, 801 P.2d at 1089,276 Cal. Rptr. at 338. See generally Note, Proposition115:
The Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, 22 PAC. LJ. 1010, 1030-32 (1991) (discussing the Raven
decision).
347. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 355, 801 P.2d at 1089, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 338 (quoting Cal-Farm
Insurance Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 821-22,771 P.2d 1247, 1256,258 Cal. Rptr. 161, 170
(1989) (considering the validity of Proposition 103, an auto insurance reform initiative)).
348. Id. at 356, 801 P.2d at 1090, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
349. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (citing Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)).
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Court has also stated that the inclusion of a severability provision
350
in a statutory scheme raises a "presumption of severability."
The 1990 Act probably does not preempt actions brought under
the California statutes with respect to works created prior to June
1, 1990, to which the artist no longer holds title. 51 Additionally,
any actions brought after the artist's death by the artist's
beneficiary, devisee, or personal representative are explicitly
excluded from preemption by the 1990 Act.3 52 Also, any action
based upon protection afforded by the California statute to items
which are not within the 1990 Act's definition of "work of visual
art" is not preempted by the 1990 Act. 353 However, since the
California statutory definition of "fine art" is even narrower than
the 1990 Act's definition of "work of visual art," it appears that
very few items will fall into this category. The California definition
of "works prepared under contract for commercial use" is more
narrow than the definition of "works for hire" in the federal
statutes.354 Consequently there may be a few instances, such as
in the case of an employee who prepares a work of fine art for
nonadvertising purposes, in which a work constituting a work for
hire under federal statutes will not constitute a work prepared for
commercial use under the California statute. In such a case, the
California statute would not be preempted.
Many of the protections offered to the artist by the California
statute will be preempted, at least when enforced by the artist and
not by a third party. The right of paternity under the California
statute is essentially identical to the analogous provision of the
1990 Act. 355 Therefore, the California provision granting the artist
the right of paternity is in all likelihood preempted by the 1990
Act.

350. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932 (1983).
351. See supra notes 334-335 and accompanying text.
352. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 605 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(C)).
353. See supra notes 328-331 and accompanying text.
354. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(b)(2), (7) (West Supp. 1991) with 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1988).
355. Compare CAL Civ. CODE § 987(d) (West Supp. 1991) with 1990 Act, supra note 192,
§ 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A)).

498

1992 / The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
While the California statute states that the artist may exercise
a right of disavowal "for just and valid reason, ' 35 6 under the
1990 Act the artist may do so only if there has been some
modification of the work which would prejudice the artist's honor
or reputation. 5 7 This situation seems to be the type which the
legislative history of the 1990 Act indicates falls within the
category of "equivalent" (and therefore preempted) provisions.3
It appears that the right of disavowal under the California statute
is preempted.
Under the 1990 Act, the artist may only exercise his or her
right of integrity based upon the distortion, mutilation, or
modification of the work if the act is injurious to the artist's honor
or reputation. 9 The California statute contains no such
restriction and offers broader protections to the artist.3 ' This is
precisely the situation used by the House Committee on the
Judiciary as an illustration of the type of statute which the 1990
Act would preempt. 361 Therefore, for actions brought by the artist
to prevent the modification of a work, the California statute is
preempted. Also, since the provisions of the 1990 Act and the
California statute prohibiting the destruction of a work are nearly
identical, 362 this provision of the California statute is preempted
as well, at least with respect to actions brought by the artist.
Some commentators may feel that once the California statute
is preempted during the life of the artist by the 1990 Act, the
statute is preempted forever, with respect to both inter vivos and
postmortem rights. However, this view appears to be contradicted

356. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (discussing the right of disavowal in
California).
357. See supra notes 230-237 and accompanying text (discussing the right of disavowal under
the 1990 Act).
358. See supra text accompanying note 336 (quoting a report by the House Committee on the
Judiciary).
359. See supra notes 238-257 and accompanying text (discussing the 1990 Act's prohibition
of modifications or alterations).
360. See supra notes 50-59 (discussing the right of integrity under the California statute).
361. See supra text accompanying note 336 (text of the Judiciary Committee report).
362. Compare CAL. CIV. CoDE § 987(c)(1) (West Supp. 1991) with 1990 Act, supra note 192,
§ 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B)). If anything, the federal law is broader, since it addresses
both intentional and grossly negligent acts, while the California statute prohibits only intentional acts.
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by the plain language of the preemption provisions of the 1990
Act. While the rights of paternity, disavowal, and integrity under
the California statute are likely preempted with respect to actions
brought by the artist to enforce his or her rights, it is probable that
actions brought after the artist's death by the artist's heirs or
personal representative will not be preempted. During the artist's
life, the validity of the California moral rights statute appears to be
suspended, but upon the artist's death and for the next fifty years,
the California statute is valid and enforceable by the beneficiaries,
devisees, or personal representative. This interaction between
federal and state laws has the anomalous result of providing greater
protection to the artist's heirs after the artist's death than the
protection provided to the artist during his or her life.
The most nebulous area in the inquiry of the validity of the
California statutes after the passage of the 1990 Act is the
enforceability of the provisions of California law granting public
interest organizations the right to protect the integrity of works of
fine art. Enforcement rights vested in public interest organizations
and enforceable after the artist's death survive the enactment of the
1990 Act. However, the gray area is the validity under the
California statute of the rights of public interest organizations to
protect the integrity of works of art during the artist's life.
It can be argued that since the California statute focuses upon
the preservation of artwork for the public interest,363 whereas the
focus of the 1990 Act is the protection of the artist's professional
reputation, the rights under the California statute are not
"equivalent" for purposes of the federal preemption provision to
the rights under the 1990 Act. However, the legislative history of
the 1990 Act shows that the preservation of works of art for the
benefit of the public at large, while not the primary goal of the
statute, was a significant motivation for passage of the 1990

363. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 989(a) (West Supp. 1991) (legislative findings and declarations,
stating: "The Legislature hereby finds and declares that there is a public interest in preserving the
integrity of cultural and artistic creations.").
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Act. 364 Congress passed the provision prohibiting the destruction
of art not to protect the artist's reputation, but to protect society's
interest in maintaining the integrity of works of art.?6 As a report
by the House Committee on the Judiciary phrased it: "The bill
furthers the preservation concept and provides in the most effective
way for the protection of the work by giving the artist the right of
integrity and the power to enforce it." 3"
It therefore appears that in enacting the 1990 Act one of
Congress' major motivations was the protection of art for society
as a whole. While the California Legislature may have believed
that the creation of enforcement rights for public interest
organizations was necessary to achieve this goal, Congress
apparently believed that allowing the artist to enforce the rights
was sufficient to achieve that goal. Therefore, it is likely that courts
would find the California statute a broader "equivalent" right, one
that is therefore preempted by the 1990 Act. However, the ultimate
resolution of this issue awaits future judicial interpretation.
It appears that the California statutory provisions protecting the
rights of integrity, paternity, and disavowal are generally preempted
during the artist's life, whether the action is brought by the artist
or by a public interest organization. However, works that are not
protected by the 1990 Act, because the artist transferred title to
them prior to the effective date of the 1990 Act, will still be

364. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. E1939, E1939 (daily ed. June 13, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Williams) (stating that the 1990 Act "would help prevent the destruction or mutilation of important
works of art-art that is an invaluable part of the American culture."); 136 CONG. REC. H3111,
H3113 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (stating that one of two goals of the
1990 Act "was to protect the works themselves. Society is the ultimate loser when these works are
modified or destroyed. They should be preserved in the way the artist intended, and as the important
part of our cultural heritage that they are."); 135 CONG. REC. E2227, E2227 (daily ed. June 20,
1989) (statement of Rep. Markey) (stating that "it is paramount to the integrity of our culture that
we preserve the integrity of our artworks."); 136 CONG. REC. S681 1, S6811 (daily ed. June 16,1989)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy) (stating that "Congress can no longer overlook its responsibility to
safeguard the nation's artistic heritage."); id. at S6813 (statement of Sen. Kasten) (stating that
"[w]orks protected by this bill are one of a kind or very limited editions. When these works are
altered or destroyed, they are gone forever. We have a duty to protect them.").
365. See supra notes 270-271 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' motivation in
prohibiting the destruction of works of art).
366. H.L REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 6915, 6926.
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protected by the California moral rights statutes. Obviously, this
category encompasses a huge volume of works. Additionally,
postmortem rights under the California statutes survive the passage
of 1990 Act, enabling public interest organizations or artists'
beneficiaries, devisees, or personal representatives to bring actions
within the time periods allowed by the California statutes.
To avoid subjecting these rights under.the statute to the analysis
announced in Raven v. Deuknejian, the California Legislature
should amend the California moral rights statutes to reflect the
partial preemption by the 1990 Act, and therefore avoid preemption
of the entire California statutory scheme through judicial
interpretation.
C. Preemption of the New York Statute
The New York statute does not incorporate a specific
severability provision. In general, however, if the issue is in doubt,
the New York courts tend to find that invalid provisions are
severable from the remainder of the statute. This principle of liberal
construction was established over seventy years ago by the New
York Court of Appeals in People ex. rel. Alpha PortlandCement
v. Knapp.367 In Knapp, the court stated that "[tihe question in
every case is whether the Legislature, if partial invalidity had been
foreseen, would have wished the statute to be enforced with the
invalid part exscinded, or rejected altogether. ' 368 The court
further stated, "Our duty is to save, unless in saving we
pervert. ' 369 In recent years, the New York courts have reaffirmed
the Knapp standard and continued to liberally interpret statutes in
favor of severability.370
The definition of "fine art" under the New York statute is
slightly broader than the analogous definition of "work of visual

367. 230 N.Y. 48, 129 N.E. 202 (1920).
368. Id. at 60, 129 N.E. at 207.
369. Id. at 63, 129 N.E. at 208.
370. See, e.g., Town ofIslip v. Caviglia, 141 A.D.2d 148, 532 N.Y.S.2d 783, 794-95 (1988)
affd, 73 N.Y.2d 544,540 N.E.2d 215,542 N.Y.S.2d 139 (advocating liberal interpretation and citing
Knapp as the appropriate standard).
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art" contained in the 1990 Act.37' Similar to the California
statute, some works may fall under the federal definition of "works
made for hire," while not falling into the corresponding New York
definition of "works prepared under contract for advertising or
trade., 372 Additionally, the New York statute includes within the
definition of "fine art" work existing in a limited edition of three
hundred, while the definition of "work of visual art" in the federal
statute allows only editions of not more than two hundred.373
Therefore, the New York statute is probably not preempted with
respect to works of art existing in limited editions of more than
two hundred but less than three hundred units.
Unlike the 1990 Act, the New York statute grants artists the
right to prevent the alteration of reproductions of items falling
within the statutory definition of "fine art."'374 The New York
statute defines the term "reproduction" as "a copy, in any
medium, of a work of fine art, that is displayed or published under
circumstances that, reasonably construed, evinces an intent that it
be taken as a representation of a work of fine art as created by the
artist. ' 375 The 1990 Act expressly provides that the rights of
paternity and disavowal do not apply with respect to
reproductions. 37 Thus, upon superficial examination, it seems as
if the New York statute directly conflicts with the 1990 Act, thus
rendering it invalid under the supremacy clause of the Constitution.
However, a report by the House Committee on the Judiciary
determined that such a situation was merely an example of an
nonequivalent right, stating that, "[flor example, the [1990 Act]
would not preempt a cause of action for misattribution of a

371. Compare N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAw § 11.01(9) (McKinney Supp. 1991) with 1990
Act, supra note 192, § 602 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 101).
372. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) with N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(3)(d)
(McKinney Supp. 1991).
373. Compare N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AIF. LAw § 14.03(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991) with 1990
Act, supra note 192, § 602 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 101).
374. Compare N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF.LAW § 14.03(3) (McKinney Supp. 1991) with 1990
Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3)).
375. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF.LAW § 11.01(16) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
376. 1990 Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3)).
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reproduction of a work of visual art.' ', 77 Therefore, so far as the
New York statute applies to reproductions, the statutory provisions
regarding the rights of paternity and disavowal are not preempted.
The right of paternity in the New York statute seems to be
identical in all relevant ways to the right of paternity contained in
the 1990 Act.378 Therefore, the New York provision relating to
the right of paternity is preempted, except so far as the provision
relates to the right of attribution of reproductions.
The right of disavowal under the New York statute requires the
artist to show a "just and valid reason" for the disavowal, and
provides that harm to the artist's reputation constitutes such just
and valid reason.3 79 Whether this provision is interpreted broadly
or narrowly, it appears that the rights created by the New York
statute are "equivalent" to those arising under the 1990 Act. The
New York provision relating to the right of disavowal therefore
appears to be preempted, except that artists may still claim a right
under the New York statute to disclaim authorship of
reproductions.
The right of integrity under the New York statute is more
narrow than the corresponding right under the 1990 Act.380 The
New York statute does not prohibit destruction of a work of art,
and the statute requires, in addition to harm to the artist's
reputation, that the art be displayed in a public place for the
violation to be actionable.3"' Since the New York statute provides
no substantive protection in this area that is not provided under the
1990 Act, it appears that the 1990 Act preempts the New York
version of the right of integrity.
As with the California statute, it appears that the New York
statute is still valid in situations where the artist has transferred title

377. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprnted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONO. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6915, 6931.
378. Compare N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AEP. LAw § 14.03(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991) with 1990
Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A)).
379. See supranotes 115-122 and accompanying text (discussing the artist's right of disavowal
under the New York statute).
380. Compare N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AsF. LAW § 14.03(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991) with 1990
Act, supra note 192, § 603 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)).
381.

504

N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFl. LAw § 14.03(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991).

1992 / The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
to a work of art before June 1, 1991, since the 1990 Act provides
no rights to the artist.382 Additionally, the 1990 Act does not
preempt the New York statutory provisions providing rights of
paternity and disavowal over reproductions. Since the New York
statute provides no postmortem rights of enforcement, and since
most other provisions of the New York statute are analogous to the
1990 Act, the 1990 Act appears to preempt all other substantive
provisions of the New York statute.
The courts in New York liberally interpret statutes in favor of
severability of invalid provisions. However, absent action by the
New York Legislature to clarify and narrow the provisions of the
New York moral rights statute, it seems possible that since so
much of the New York statute has been preempted that, even under
the liberal New York severability rules, the New York courts may
determine that the statute is preempted in its entirety. The New
York Legislature, like the California Legislature, should therefore
take action to avoid total preemption of its moral rights statute.
D. Tactical Considerations and the Possibility of Inconsistent
Results Under State Law Claims
Although Congress intended in enacting the 1990 Act to create
a uniform nationwide system of rights and obligations relating to
the moral rights of artists,38 3 this intent could be temporarily
frustrated by artful pleading.
It is likely that federal courts would have fewer reservations
about declaring a state statute to be preempted than state courts
sitting in the jurisdiction which enacted the state statute.
Consequently, particularly in nondiversity cases in which removal
to federal courts for reasons of diversity of citizenship is not a
problem, plaintiffs in jurisdictions offering broad rights to artists

382. See supra notes 334-335 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history indicating
that the 1990 Act does not preempt state law in such circumstances).
383. See supra notes 337-338 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' motives in
preempting state statutes).
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under state statutes may wish to pursue claims in state courts rather
than in federal courts.
Under the firmly rooted "well-pleaded complaint rule," federal
courts may not allow removal of an action filed in state court to be
removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction3 4 unless the
basis of the federal jurisdiction appears plainly on the complaint as
it is written, or as it should be written. 5 Under the well-pleaded
complaint rule, the fact that a defendant could assert some federal
defense is not sufficient to allow removal of an action to a federal
court."8 A case is only removable to federal court if the
plaintiff's cause of action is based upon federal law. 87 In
Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,38
the Supreme Court of the United States determined that the wellpleaded complaint rule applies to claims by defendants that the
plaintiff's cause of action is preempted by federal law, even if the
claim is brought as a declaratory judgment action."8 9
The analysis under Franchise Tax Board was somewhat
complicated by the Supreme Court's recent unanimous decision in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor.9 In Metropolitan
Life, the Court allowed removal of an action based on the fact that
the state common law action was preempted by federal law,
specifically the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA).3 9 ' The Court reasoned that this result was justified only
because Congress had totally occupied the field in the area of such
employee rights, and because Congress had clearly manifested its
384. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (granting jurisdiction to the federal courts to hear matters
arising under the laws and Constitution of the United States, subject to such exceptions as Congress

may make); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) (congressional grant of authority of federal courts to hear
federal question cases).
385. See generally Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (seminal
case setting forth the well-pleaded complaint rule).
386. Id, at 152.
387.

Id See E. CHEMERINsKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 230-41 (1989) (discussion of the well

pleaded complaint rule). For a critical discussion of the well-pleaded complaint rule, see Doernberg,
There's No Reason forIt; It'sJust Our Policy: Why the Well-PleadedComplainr Rule Sabotages the
Purposes of FederalQuestion Jurisdiction,38 HASTINGS Li. 597 (1987).
388. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
389. Id at 24-26.
390. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
391. Id. at 66-67.

506

1992 / The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
intent that such causes of action be removable to federal court. 3"
While at least one noted authority believes that the Metropolitan
Life case stands for the proposition that any state court action is
removable to federal court "based on a claim of preemption if
Congress has created [an express] cause of action," 393 the
standard established in Metropolitan Life seems much more
restrictive. As Justice Brennan explained in his concurring opinion:
While I join the Court's opinion, I note that our decision should not be
interpreted as adopting a broad rule that any defense premised on

congressional intent to preempt state law is sufficient to establish
removal jurisdiction. The court holds only that removal jurisdiction

exists when, as here, "Congress has clearly manifested394an intent to
make causes of action.., removable to federal court."

The majority opinion stated that absent explicit direction from
Congress regarding removal to federal court, the Court "would be
reluctant to find that ordinary pre-emptive power" converts an
ordinary state common law complaint into one stating395a federal
claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.
Since Congress did not totally preempt state moral rights
enforcement actions, and since Congress did not choose to provide
explicit removal provisions in the 1990 Act, it seems likely that the
removability of a state action based upon a defendant's claim of
preemption by the 1990 Act will be determined by the reasoning
of FranchiseTax Board,rather than the reasoning of Metropolitan
Life. Further, the Supreme Court has held that preemption claims

392.

Id. at 63-66.

393. See E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 387, at 234-35. See also Twitchell, Characterizing
FederalClaims: Preemption,Remova4 andthe Arising UnderJurisdictionofthe FederalCourts,54
GEo. WASH. L REv. 812, 865 (1986) (advocating the creation of a standard similar to the one
Professor Chemerinsky perceives the Court as having created in MetropolitanLife).
concurring) (citation omitted) (emphasis
394. MetropolitanLife, 481 U.S. at 67-68 (Brennan, J.,
and omission in original).
395. 14.at 65.
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cannot form the basis of a federal action brought under title 42 of
the United States Code, section 1983. 39"
Therefore, plaintiffs may wish to file actions in state court to
avail themselves of more favorable rulings by state judges. This is
not meant to imply that state judges will intentionally interpret the
preemption provisions of the 1990 Act in a manner inconsistent
with the Constitution or the plain meaning of the law. However, in
questionable cases, federal judges seem naturally more inclined
than state judges to interpret federal law as preempting state law.
Consequently, until a case is heard on appeal in the Supreme Court
of the United States, there is a chance of inconsistent rulings
among the eleven states that have enacted statutory moral rights
protections.
CONCLUSION

In enacting the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Congress
recognized the value of providing for a uniform system of
protection for both the rights of artists and the interests of the
public at large in maintaining works of visual art in a condition
best reflecting the artist's vision and conception. The state statutes
regulating moral rights remain relevant to the extent that they
regulate the misattribution of reproductions, postmortem rights, or
the rights of artists who have conveyed title to their works prior to
the effective date of the 1990 Act.
While in certain states, particularly those states following the
California model of protection of artists' moral rights, the
enactment of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 and the act's
corresponding preemption of state law may represent a narrowing
of the rights of artists and of the public as a whole. However, the
reduction of rights in these few states seems a small price to pay

396. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 110 S. Ct. 444,449 (1989). The Court
determined that the supremacy clause of the Constitution does not create rights enforceable under
section 1983. Id See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1987) (creating a cause of action for acts, under the color
of state authority, in violation of rights created by the Constitution or federal statutes).
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for the establishment or vast enlargement of rights in most other
states.
As one of the cosponsors of the bill stated:
Artists in this country play a very important role in capturing the
essence of culture and recording it for future generations. It is often
through art that we are able to see truths, both beautiful and ugly.
Therefore ...
it is paramount to the expression of our culture that
we preserve the integrity of our artworks as expressions of creativity of
the artist. John Ruskin, a famous historian and philosopher once said,
"All great art is the work397
of the whole living creature, body and soul,
and chiefly of the soul."

The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 will go a long way towards
protecting the creativity of the artist and the artist's attempt to

capture the zeitgeist of his or her time.

397.

135 CONG. REc. E2227, E2227 (daily ed. June 20, 1989) (statement of Rep. Markey).
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